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INTRODUCTION
Judicial precedent is defeasible and it is indispensable. The Supreme
Court commonly explains that respect for precedent is important, and even
necessary, to the rule of law. At the same time, the Court cautions that no
precedent is beyond reconsideration and the doctrine of stare decisis is not
an “inexorable command” to endure the mistakes of the past.1 Standing by
precedent is “the preferred course” for reasons sounding in consistency,
predictability, efficiency, and “the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process.”2 Still, preferred is different from required.3 Sometimes
1
For support of the idea that following precedent is not an “inexorable command,” see, for example,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010); FEC
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236,
251 (1998); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 547 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); United States
v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995); Holder
v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 944–45 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); and Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 573 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
2
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
3
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1537 (2000) [hereinafter Paulsen,
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there are good reasons to depart from the past. When there are, the pull of
precedent can give way.
There is no inherent contradiction in this vision of precedent. Fidelity
to prior decisions can be integral to the rule of law and rebuttable for
compelling reasons. The mystery is not how these principles coexist but
where they come from. The Constitution does not expressly discuss the role
of judicial precedent or the doctrine of stare decisis. While some
commentators argue that deference to precedent is encompassed in
provisions like Article III’s “judicial Power,” not everyone agrees.4 Another
possibility is that the Constitution takes no position on precedent, implicitly
authorizing courts to apply common law principles of stare decisis.5 Or
maybe the Constitution actually forbids deference to precedent, at least when
a decision deviates from the document’s meaning as properly understood.
These possibilities are intriguing, and the scholarship analyzing them is
insightful and instructive. But I want to approach the connection between
precedent and constitutional law from a different angle. My claim is that we
can view deference to precedent as an implicit constitutional principle that
coheres with key features of the framework of American government.6 This
vision of precedent as a “basic self-governing principle within the Judicial
Branch” has arisen from time to time in Supreme Court opinions.7 My aim
is to give it sustained attention and, in doing so, to take a step forward in
understanding the constitutional dimensions of stare decisis.
Defending precedent as a constitutional principle does not fully
determine how sharply past decisions should constrain future courts. Neither
does my argument fully determine the set of considerations that can justify
overruling prior decisions. Even so, studying the constitutional foundations
of precedent helps to define the rules of engagement for courts tasked with
applying old decisions to new facts. It also offers lessons about what federal
judges must do, may do, and cannot do in their treatment of precedent. And
the same goes for Congress. To take an example to which I return below, if

Abrogating Stare Decisis]; id. at 1538 (describing the Supreme Court as taking the position that “stare
decisis is neither a doctrine of constitutional dimension nor a strict rule of law, but rather is a
subconstitutional doctrine of ostensibly wise judicial practice, procedure, and policy”).
4
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see infra Section I.A.
5
For purposes of this Article, I will be using the terms “common law” and “general law” to mean
the same thing: a body of unwritten law operating to inform the treatment of precedent. For a discussion
of situations in which distinguishing between the two terms might matter, see William Baude & Stephen
E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1137–38 (2017).
6
Contra Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at 1548 (arguing that “stare decisis is a
policy judgment, not a rule of law specified in the Constitution or clearly implicit in its provisions or
overall structure”).
7
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
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the Constitution requires presumptive deference to precedent, Congress has
no power to eliminate that presumption. But to the extent stare decisis rests
on a legal foundation apart from the Constitution itself, the doctrine may be
susceptible to congressional abolition. Putting these principles together, I
will contend that while legislation can affect the various factors that are
included in the doctrinal calculus—much like it affects the federal courts’
admission of evidence8—the Constitution implies a baseline presumption of
deference that even Congress cannot remove.
Recognizing the constitutional salience of precedent also responds to
the objection that deferring to flawed decisions is unlawful. While the
Constitution does not contain a “Stare Decisis Clause,”9 the legal validity of
deference arises by implication from the Constitution’s structure, text, and
historical context. This approach helps to square the Supreme Court’s view
of “respect for precedent” as “indispensable”10 with its seemingly discordant
description of stare decisis as “a policy judgment.”11 Fidelity to precedent
reflects a policy judgment rather than an unflinching command in the sense
that it sometimes gives way: namely, when there is a special justification for
overruling.12 Still, the general presumption of deference remains
“indispensable” to American constitutional law even as it allows some
decisions to be overruled.13
This Article proceeds in four parts, beginning with constitutional
foundations and moving to practical implications. Part I provides
background by exploring some prominent analyses of the connection (or lack
thereof) between precedent and the Constitution.
Part II develops an account of precedent as a constitutional principle.
By giving federal judges life tenure and salary protection, the Constitution
makes plain its vision of the judiciary as both enduring and independent of
official and electoral control. The task assigned to the judiciary is also
important: notwithstanding its areas of specificity, the Constitution often
rests upon general concepts and commitments rather than detailed

8

See infra Part IV.
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at 1571.
10
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citation omitted).
11
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
12
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 581–82 (2001) [hereinafter Fallon, Stare Decisis] (“That a
principle is not absolute, or that a principle reflects judgments that include concerns of policy, does not
entail that it lacks constitutional authorization.”).
13
Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
9
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commands.14 Whatever her interpretive principles, a judge inevitably will
find herself without clear solutions to some constitutional disputes.15
That raises the question of what independent judges should do in the
face of an uncertain (at least in some respects) Constitution. I submit that the
constitutional blueprint suggests presumptive deference to precedent as the
appropriate response. The founding generation was familiar with the use of
past decisions to guide courts and to create space between the views of the
individual judge and the content of the law. A practice of deferring to past
decisions performs a constraining function notwithstanding the lack of
official and electoral control over judges. It limits the extent to which judges
may revise the existing body of constitutional law based on their personal
philosophies—even when those philosophies are held and applied in good
faith.
Without a practice of deferring to past decisions, life-tenured and
salary-protected judges would receive substantial discretion to interpret the
Constitution according to their individual methodological and normative
premises. That discretion would remain even if the judges devoted
themselves to following the document’s text, because the text does not
resolve every constitutional question. The doctrine of stare decisis offers a
response to the challenges raised by inevitable disagreements over
interpretive philosophy, especially as applied to a charter that is general and
uncertain in multiple respects. Precedent constrains discretion while
preserving the judiciary’s independence from political forces, and it guides
decisionmaking even when the Constitution is ambiguous or opaque. It also
instills the law with a sense of stability that transcends interpretive debates

14
This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as underdeterminacy. E.g., Randy E. Barnett,
Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 777 n.113 (1997) (using the concept of underdeterminacy
in the context of originalist analysis to refer to situations in which “the original understanding might
exclude a great many, but still not all, interpretations”); Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (“The law is underdeterminate with
respect to a given case if and only if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the legal
materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results.”). In this Article, I use the term
indeterminacy rather than underdeterminacy, mainly for syllabic savings but also because the colloquial
sense of indeterminacy captures the idea of texts that leave multiple options (even if not infinite options)
available.
15
See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 7–8 (2010) (“Many provisions of the
U.S. Constitution are quite precise and leave no room for quarreling, or for fancy questions about
interpretation. . . . But other provisions of the Constitution, while written in plain enough English, do not
give us such unequivocal instructions.”); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical
Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) (“Even after context is considered,
vague terms in the Constitution may continue to underdetermine the content of constitutional doctrine
and the outcome of constitutional cases.”); cf. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 7 (2011) (“When
the Constitution uses vague standards or abstract principles, we must apply them to our own
circumstances in our own time.”).
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and separates the Constitution from the perspectives of those who apply it.
The Supreme Court has been willing to make inferences from constitutional
structure in contexts including sovereign immunity, federalism, and the
separation of powers.16 I hope to show that deference to precedent can be
understood in a similar way.
Part III examines how precedent works in concrete cases. I contend that
the principle of deference requires a special justification for overruling that
goes beyond disagreement with a decision on the merits. The principle that
overrulings should require more than disagreement allows precedent to play
the constraining, stabilizing role the Constitution leaves for it.17 Beyond this
constitutional baseline, I offer some supplemental principles for
implementing the doctrine. For example, I suggest that judges should resist
the urge to overrule decisions that they deem to be clearly erroneous or
poorly reasoned, because such descriptions tend to be bound up with
methodological tendencies that vary from judge to judge. This rule, however,
is not itself a constitutional inference. The constitutional imperative begins
and ends with a presumption of deference. Even so, in thinking about how
stare decisis is best operationalized, it is useful to draw on the core principles
of stability and impersonality that animate the doctrine.
Finally, Part IV turns to the broader implications of determining
whether the doctrine of stare decisis has constitutional foundations. Perhaps
most importantly, to the extent stare decisis is a constitutional principle, it is
insulated from congressional abolition. At the same time, the argument from
constitutional structure theoretically leaves room for Congress to affect the
components of stare decisis doctrine.
Before proceeding, I offer three notes about the scope of this Article.
First, my analysis is limited to the federal judiciary, even though many of the
costs and benefits of deferring to precedent extend to state courts as well.
Second, while I will briefly discuss the effect of Supreme Court precedents
on lower courts, my focus will be the Supreme Court’s treatment of its own
prior decisions; issues of discretion and constraint loom particularly large for
a superior tribunal with no official oversight and no fear of judicial reversal.
Third, though I will have a few words to say about statutory construction,
what follows will deal primarily with constitutional cases and the interpretive
disputes they generate.

16

See infra Section II.C.
See, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“Who ignores [the doctrine of stare decisis] must give reasons, and reasons
that go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong (otherwise the doctrine would
be no doctrine at all).”).
17
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I.

PRECEDENT AS POLICY AND LAW

The Supreme Court has called deference to precedent a “principle of
policy.”18 The basic idea is that judges should pay attention to the problems
that legal U-turns can create, but they should not treat precedents as
unflinching commands.19 Hence the Court’s reference to a “series of
prudential and pragmatic considerations”—including procedural
workability, factual changes, reliance interests, and developments in related
areas of the law—that bear on whether a dubious decision should be
jettisoned or retained.20
The word “policy” can be misleading. It would be going too far to
conclude from the Court’s “principle of policy” language that deference to
precedent has no legal foundation.21 “Policy” does not necessarily mean “not
law.” Consider, for example, the Court’s description of the overbreadth
doctrine of First Amendment jurisprudence as driven by “countervailing
policies” that sometimes outweigh the general policy against challenging a
law’s constitutionality as applied to someone else.22 By referring to policies,

18
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010) (“[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not
a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); cf. Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910) (“The rule of
stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it
shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again
called upon to consider a question once decided.”); Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at
1537 (“Stare decisis, the Supreme Court has often reminded us, is a rule of policy, not a rule of law.”).
19
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 378 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“When considering whether to
reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having constitutional
questions decided against the importance of having them decided right. As Justice Jackson explained,
this requires a ‘sober appraisal of the disadvantages of the innovation as well as those of the questioned
case, a weighing of practical effects of one against the other.’” (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Decisional
Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J. 334, 334 (1944))).
20
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992); see also Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 362–63 (“Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to
the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of
course whether the decision was well reasoned.” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montejo v.
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009))); STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A
JUDGE’S VIEW 152 (2010) (discussing factors including “the public’s reliance on a decision,” how long
ago a precedent was decided, whether a precedent has “created a set of unworkable legal rules,” whether
a precedent itself represented a departure from settled law, and whether a precedent “has become well
embedded in national culture”).
21
See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503,
508 (2000) (interpreting judicial depictions of stare decisis as a policy to mean “the rule [of stare decisis]
is not absolute” and “the norms are influenced by and reflect policy considerations, as does the common
law generally”).
22
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (“The policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of
information and opinion.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 754 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (noting the “strong First Amendment policy against prior restraints on publication”).
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the Court is not saying its analysis is grounded in extralegal considerations.
So, too, in the context of stare decisis. When it invokes its “policy” language,
what the Court seems to mean is that the presumption of deference is
rebuttable under the right circumstances—namely, when it is more important
for the law to be right than settled.23 The same conclusion flows from the
Supreme Court’s characterization of deference to precedent as a “foundation
stone”24 that is “indispensable”25 to the rule of law. Precedent might be
defeasible, but it is also crucial to American constitutional law. Being
faithful to the law means paying proper attention to prior judicial decisions.
It does not mean those decisions must always be followed.26
The question remains: What makes it lawful for today’s Justice to vote
to uphold a decision she thinks is wrong, even (or especially) if that decision
involves an important constitutional issue? The Court’s description of
deference as a principle of policy does not answer that question. We need to
dig deeper to figure out where the policy comes from. A host of scholars
have done just that, examining various explanations for the legal validity of
deference to constitutional decisions.
Two broad categories of arguments are most relevant here. The first
category links deference with a particular provision in the Constitution’s
text—such as the “judicial Power” of Article III. The second treats deference
as part of the common law background that predated the Constitution and
remained intact after ratification.27 These arguments are intricate, and I make
no pretense of passing conclusive judgment on either one. But summarizing
them is helpful both in understanding the lay of the land and in framing the
constitutional argument that I develop in Part II.
23
See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Fallon,
Stare Decisis, supra note 12, at 581 (noting that the Court’s statements that “stare decisis is ‘not an
inexorable command’ . . . need imply no more than that stare decisis, like many principles of
constitutional stature, is capable of being overridden”).
24
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014); see also Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 378 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that the “greatest purpose [of stare decisis] is to serve
a constitutional ideal—the rule of law”).
25
Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
26
See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 180 (2005) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit) (“No judge gets up every morning with a clean slate and says, well, what should the
Constitution look like today? . . . You begin with the precedents. . . . Those precedents become part of
the rule of law that the judge must apply.”).
27
Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723,
754 (1988) (“One could argue that the principle of stare decisis inheres in the ‘judicial power’ of article
III. Alternatively, stare decisis could possess the nature of constitutional common law: not a constitutional
imperative, but simply the natural result of judicial powers and duties established in the text and ultimately
subject to the control of Congress.”).
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A. Constitutional Text
The Constitution’s Third Article vests the “judicial Power” of the
United States “in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”28 Our present concern
is whether the judicial power implies anything about the role of precedent.
The phrase does not explicitly address the doctrine of stare decisis, so the
question becomes whether its deeper meaning informs the treatment of prior
judicial decisions.29
The answer depends in the first instance on methodological choices
about how the Constitution should be interpreted. Are we interested in the
meaning of the judicial power as understood in modern times? Or the
meaning of the judicial power at the time of ratification? Or the meaning of
the judicial power that leads to the best results? Or some combination of
these? Or something else entirely?
To begin with prevailing understandings: there is no doubt that appeals
to precedent—even appeals that infuse precedent with “decision-altering
effect”30—are a familiar part of modern American law. Judicial nominees
talk about stare decisis with reverence during their confirmation hearings.31
They use similar language after they are confirmed.32 If our touchstone is
contemporary discourse, the lawfulness of deferring to precedent is clear.
Richard Fallon highlights this point in connecting “the relative entrenchment
of stare decisis” with its “constitutionally authorized status.”33 This does not
mean the Constitution’s text will or should be ignored, but it does mean the
“judicial Power” reflects accepted practice as well as language and history.34
28

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Cf. JOHN O. MC GINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION
168 (2013) (“The term judicial power in Article III is, at least on its face, ambiguous. It might be
understood narrowly to mean the power to say what the law is in a particular judicial proceeding. But it
might also be understood more broadly to include certain traditional aspects of the judicial office that
were widely and consistently exercised.”).
30
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 289, 293 n.14 (2005) [hereinafter Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting Influence].
31
See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 26, at 158 (describing judicial humility as involving, among other
things, “respect for precedent that forms part of the rule of law and that the judge is obligated to apply
under principles of stare decisis”).
32
See Fallon, Stare Decisis, supra note 12, at 582–83 (“The Supreme Court invokes stare decisis
with great regularity. Indeed, I am aware of no Justice, up through and including those currently sitting,
who persistently has questioned the legitimacy of stare decisis or failed to apply it.”).
33
Id. at 582.
34
See id. at 577 (“Article III’s grant of ‘the judicial Power’ authorizes the Supreme Court to elaborate
and rely on a principle of stare decisis and, more generally, to treat precedent as a constituent element of
constitutional adjudication.”); id. at 588 (“It is crucial that stare decisis can be seen as an authorized aspect
of the ‘judicial Power’ conferred by Article III, even though—what is equally crucial—the norms defining
the ‘judicial Power’ are themselves largely unwritten and owe their status to considerations going well
29
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We cannot understand the judicial power, the argument goes, until we know
how courts are exercising it. And they are exercising it in a way that treats
presumptive deference to precedent as lawful and appropriate.35
While Supreme Court opinions regularly treat deference to precedent
as lawful, they do not clearly ground the authority to defer in the Article III
judicial power.36 That creates the possibility of linking precedent with other
clauses. For example, one might look to Article VI and its description of
“This Constitution” as the “supreme Law of the Land.”37 Frederick Schauer
contends that “[s]hould the American people, or American judges, decide
that judicial precedents should be authoritative in constitutional
decisionmaking, and should count as part of what ‘the Constitution’ is,
nothing in the Constitution itself could preclude such a social and political
decision.”38 Understood in this way, the Supremacy Clause provides another
potential basis for grounding deference to precedent in the Constitution’s
text.
Alternatively, the status of stare decisis as a widespread practice could
establish the doctrine’s validity without connecting it to any particular
provision. The rationale would be that areas of textual uncertainty, such as
the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication, should be resolved in
ways that reflect “social facts” and accepted practices.39
beyond the ‘plain meaning’ of the Constitution’s language and its ‘original understanding.’”); id. at 582
(arguing that it “matters enormously that stare decisis is a principle with deep roots in historical and
contemporary practice”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 115–16 (2001)
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s authority to endow its precedents with power to trump what otherwise would
be the best interpretation of the written Constitution cannot be derived from the written Constitution
alone.”).
35
See Fallon, Stare Decisis, supra note 12, at 591 (“[S]tare decisis merits recognition as
constitutionally authorized. . . . [T]he considerations supporting this conclusion include, but are not
limited to, the doctrine’s entrenched status and its normative desirability. Stare decisis is also reasonably
consistent with the Constitution’s language and structure, and the evidence concerning the original
understanding by no means mandates its rejection.”).
36
The Court has used the phrases “stare decisis” and “judicial power” in proximity in decisions like
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, but without setting forth a comprehensive
argument that the Article III judicial power encompasses a doctrine of stare decisis. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864–65 (1992) (“Our analysis would not be complete . . .
without explaining why overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result
under principles of stare decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial
power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.”).
37
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
38
Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional Norms, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 55 (1994).
39
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist
Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1126 (2008) [hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Precedent]; cf.
Baude & Sachs, supra note 5, at 1129 (arguing that judges who are responding to indeterminacy “take
their cues from an existing legal system, of which the interpretive rules form a part”); Jeffrey A.
Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 98 (2016) (noting—albeit in the
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An additional possibility for defending stare decisis is that the doctrine
produces desirable results. Those results might include the protection of
settled expectations, the conservation of judicial resources, or the assurance
that like cases will be treated alike through consistent application of evenhanded principles.40 The textual arguments discussed above would remain
relevant; a focus on results is commonly coupled with attention to factors
such as text, structure, and history.41 The argument would be that deference
to precedent is warranted because the doctrine of stare decisis creates
meaningful benefits and because it plausibly fits with the text of provisions
such as the Article III judicial power.
If we shift from contemporary practice and pragmatic benefits to
original meanings, we encounter a different set of claims. Some argue that
the original meaning of the Article III judicial power encompasses the
authority to give weight to prior decisions.42 There may even be a duty to
defer under certain circumstances.43 An elegant version of this argument
comes from John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, who read Article III as
requiring courts to give weight to a series of decisions on a particular issue
while allowing courts to develop supplemental rules of precedent that do not
flow directly from the Constitution.44
Yet there is no consensus about the relationship between judicial
precedent and constitutional text. Some scholars take the view that Article

course of challenging—an argumentative shift “away from abstract conceptual or normative arguments
about interpretation” and toward “how we actually understand and apply the Constitution as law”).
40
See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 20, at 151 (“Lower-court judges, lawyers, clients, and ordinary
Americans all need stable law so that judges can decide their cases, lawyers can advise their clients,
clients can make decisions, and ordinary Americans can buy homes, enter into contracts, and go about
their daily lives without fear that changes in the law will turn their lives topsy-turvy.”).
41
See id. at 80–81 (discussing a pragmatic tradition whereby judges “use textual language, history,
context, relevant traditions, precedent, purposes, and consequences in their efforts to properly interpret
an ambiguous text,” but noting that “when faced with open-ended language and a difficult interpretive
question,” such judges “rely heavily on purposes and related consequences”).
42
See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 58–59 (2008). Professor Gerhardt adds
another dimension to his textual argument by contending that “[t]he exercise of Article III judicial power
entails deliberating over how it ought to be exercised,” and that “[d]eciding cases entails determining how
much weight to accord to precedent and other sources of constitutional meaning.” Id. at 59.
43
See Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent,
and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 447 (2006) (arguing that “by 1787–1789, the concept of
judicial power included significant respect for precedent” and that “judges would be bound by precedent
such that they would have to follow analogous precedent or give significant reasons for not doing so”).
44
See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 168 (“There are strong reasons for concluding that
the Framers’ generation would have understood the judicial power to include a minimal concept of
precedent, which requires that some weight be given to a series of decisions.”); id. at 169 (“The bulk of
precedent rules . . . are a matter of common law that is revisable by congressional statute.”).
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III tells us little or nothing about the status of precedent.45 A few go further
and read the Constitution as foreclosing deference to flawed constitutional
decisions. A prominent version of this latter argument, as presented by Gary
Lawson, includes three steps that are most relevant here. First, the judicial
power “is the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law.”46
Second, the Constitution itself is hierarchically superior to all other sources
of law.47 Finally, “the power and duty to decide in accordance with law
includes the power and duty to decide in accordance with the Constitution,
even when . . . prior courts . . . have said otherwise.”48 Michael Paulsen takes
a similar position when he contends that the doctrine of stare decisis is
unlawful “precisely to the extent that it yields deviations from the correct
interpretation of the Constitution!”49
My project is not to evaluate these approaches—aside from the claim
that the Constitution forbids deference to flawed precedents, to which I
return below—but to recognize the implications of the diversity of views.
The case law and commentary are home to competing perspectives about
whether Article III’s judicial power (or other constitutional provisions)
45
Harrison, supra note 21, at 525 (“It is highly unlikely that when the Constitution was adopted
Americans believed that the principle of stare decisis was hard-wired into the concept of judicial power.
There were norms of precedent, but they were principles of general jurisprudence, no more fixed by the
Constitution than is the law of admiralty.”); Gary Lawson, Rebel Without a Clause: The Irrelevance of
Article VI to Constitutional Supremacy, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 38 (2011) (“The
‘judicial Power’ is the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law. If the Constitution
conflicts with any other potentially applicable source of law, such as statutes or prior judicial decisions
. . . , the Constitution must prevail.”); Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at 1571 (“The
constitutional text simply cannot be read to support the assertion of a plenary judicial power to vest
precedent with quasi-legislative force, effectively altering the meaning of the Constitution’s commands
for purposes of judicial interpretation in subsequent cases.”). Thomas Healy also rejects the argument
that the judicial power is best understood as encompassing an obligation to follow precedent, though he
leaves open the possibility that “stare decisis is essential to the legitimacy of the courts and is therefore a
de facto constitutional requirement.” Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: Four Questions
and Answers, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1180–83 (2008); cf. Norman R. Williams, The Failings of
Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 767 (2004)
(arguing that “the historical materials regarding Article III and the federal courts are too opaque to provide
any definitive sense of the Framers’ views of the role of precedent in federal court adjudication”).
46
Lawson, supra note 45, at 38.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting Influence, supra note 30, at 291; see also id. at 290 (“If one has
a theory of stare decisis that permits precedent decisions to have genuine decision-altering weight—that
is, if precedents dictate different results than the interpreter otherwise would reach in the absence of such
precedents—then stare decisis corrupts the otherwise ‘pure’ constitutional decision-making process.”).
Jonathan Mitchell likewise disputes that Article III establishes a doctrine of constitutional stare decisis,
though he advances a different textualist argument to defend the doctrine in certain subcategories of
constitutional cases. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV.
1, 68 (2011) (concluding that “the written Constitution permits the Supreme Court to use wrongly decided
precedents as rules of decision whenever it upholds a federal statute or treaty, or invalidates a state law”).
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suggests anything about the role of precedent. For some, the text of the
Constitution encompasses a degree of respect for precedent. For others, the
text does no such thing. To be sure, modern courts commonly defer to
precedent. But whether that practice coheres with the Constitution remains
subject to debate.
B. Common Law
The Constitution’s plain text might not clearly authorize deference to
precedent, but neither does the text clearly forbid deference. That opens the
door to other arguments for establishing the legal validity of stare decisis in
constitutional cases.
An intriguing possibility is that principles of stare decisis that existed
prior to the founding are best understood as having carried over into
postconstitutional practice—not via express incorporation by the
Constitution’s text but by being left undisturbed. Among the scholars
advancing arguments in this spirit is John Harrison, who concludes that
“[t]he norms of precedent as the federal courts know them consist mainly of
unwritten principles that are characterized as binding law but that reflect
substantial judicial input, custom, and practice.”50 Stephen Sachs likewise
suggests that stare decisis, while not “hard-cod[ed]” into the Constitution,
was a common law backdrop against which the document was enacted and
that remained in effect going forward.51 And though they defend a narrow
principle of stare decisis as emerging from the Article III judicial power,
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport also view background assumptions
at the time of the founding as crucial to understanding the modern law of
precedent. 52 For them, the historical background creates a strong
presumption “against any constitutional interpretation that prohibits”
deference to precedent, and the Constitution’s text does nothing to rebut that
presumption.53
If these scholars are correct that the Constitution left in place common
law understandings about precedent, the next step is figuring out what those
understandings were (and are). It is possible that the treatment of precedent
should follow the rules that existed at the time of the founding. It is also
50

Harrison, supra note 21, at 529.
Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1865 (2012).
52
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 154–55 (“Precedent was an important part of AngloAmerican law for centuries before the enactment of the Constitution, and the Founding generation
expected precedent to apply to, and continue after, the Constitution.”); id. at 168 (“The judicial power
can be understood as requiring judges to deploy a minimal concept of precedent—a concept of precedent
that was followed widely and consistently from at least the time of Coke until the enactment of the
Constitution.”).
53
Id. at 157.
51
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possible that what carried over were not specific rules, but a general
recognition of each generation’s power to fashion its own doctrine of
precedent. The latter approach would establish the legal validity of stare
decisis “without requiring identification of a single, unchanging approach.”54
Whatever its precise formulation, the common law argument is rooted in
preconstitutional understandings about the role and function of judicial
decisions: deference to precedent is lawful because it is authorized by
background understandings that the Constitution left in place.
The common law argument has different implications than theories that
tether precedent to provisions such as the Article III judicial power. Most
importantly, as I will discuss in Part IV, a doctrine of stare decisis that is
grounded in the common law is subject to congressional revision to a greater
degree than a doctrine grounded in the Constitution itself. While a common
law doctrine of precedent is in some ways a “law of first resort,”55 a
constitutional requirement works differently. That makes it crucial to
pinpoint the source of the doctrine—not only to determine its lawfulness but
also to understand its degree of insulation from legislative revision.
II. PRECEDENT AS CONSTITUTIONAL INFERENCE
There is another way to think about the relationship between precedent
and the Constitution. Deference to precedent might not arise out of any
particular clause. Nevertheless, it might be something more than a
background assumption of the common law. This Part develops an account
of deference to precedent as an inference from the Constitution’s text,
structure, and historical context—in other words, as an implicit principle of
constitutional law.
My analysis begins with the Constitution’s conceptualization of the
judiciary, including its granting of life tenure and salary protection to federal
judges. By insulating courts from official and electoral control, the
Constitution raises questions about what remains to constrain judges, if
judges are to be constrained at all. I want to be precise about the sort of
constraint I am describing. The point is not to try to bind federal judges who
wish to ignore the law for their own ends. I do not know any such judges,
and to the extent they exist they would be no more likely to follow precedent
than to follow the text of a constitutional provision they find problematic.
54

Id. at 171; cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
552–53 (2003) [hereinafter Nelson, Originalism] (“[M]embers of the founding generation could have
expected future interpreters to use the liquidation process even if no relevant interpretive conventions told
them to read this instruction into the Constitution itself.”).
55
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1975).
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The type of constraint that I wish to discuss, and the type of constraint to
which legal text and doctrine matter immensely, relates to judges who are
seeking in good faith to apply the law in a principled fashion.
There is reason to be skeptical of reading the Constitution to permit the
constant disruption of established doctrines based on nothing more than
disagreement between the Justices of past and present. This vision of judicial
decisionmaking is in tension with a constitutional blueprint that elevates the
institution over the individual and treats the Supreme Court as a continuous
body that retains its identity over time. Hence the need for constraint—not
to prevent Justices from engaging in outrageous or lawless conduct but to
prevent reasonable disagreements over judicial philosophy from
destabilizing constitutional law. Of course the Constitution contemplates that
new Justices will arrive at the Court, and of course it allows those Justices to
reconsider problematic decisions, but that is different from accepting
constitutional vacillation as the corollary of reasonable disagreement.
Disagreements over interpretive philosophy have been around as long
as there has been a Constitution.56 And the need for some safeguard against
excessive vacillation in interpretive approach is all the greater because the
Constitution’s language is uncertain in important ways. That leaves the
Justices to make choices that are not expressly dictated by the document’s
text. Such discretion is properly understood as cabined by a presumption of
deference to precedent.
In sum, I view several features of the constitutional blueprint as
converging to support an understanding of precedent as presumptively
binding: the distinctive role, independence, and continuity of the judiciary;
the uncertainty and generality of constitutional text in many respects;
background understandings about the role of precedent in guiding judicial
discretion; and related understandings about the use of precedent to settle the
Constitution’s meaning. That is in addition to the Supreme Court’s
descriptions of stare decisis as crucial to the rule of law.57
The account I propose is not strictly “originalist” in the sense of being
derived from the original intentions or understandings of the framing
generation. At the same time, I draw on Framing-Era understandings—in
addition to other factors—as informing our thinking about the constitutional
blueprint. Ultimately, my aim is to provide an account of how the
Constitution’s relationship with precedent ought to be understood today,

56
See Nelson, Originalism, supra note 54, at 570 (“[P]eople who discussed the Constitution’s
meaning proposed a variety of different interpretive approaches.”).
57
See supra Part I.
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while focusing on factors that are meaningful to jurists and scholars of
varying interpretive philosophies.
A. Judicial Role
Whatever the exact meaning of the Article III judicial power,58 the
Constitution distinguishes it from the powers given to the legislative and
executive branches. The separation suggests a vision of judges as engaged in
a different sort of enterprise from their political peers. This recognition may
seem prosaic, but it is important nevertheless. The Constitution makes plain
that judges do not create or execute laws in the way that legislators and
executive officials do. Inherent in Hamilton’s description of the judiciary as
the “least dangerous” branch is the idea that judgment is different in kind
from the political powers of “purse” and “sword.”59
There is a similar lesson in Article III’s description of the judicial power
as extending to cases and controversies.60 The focus on resolving disputes
suggests that, unlike the political branches which lead the polity forward, the
judicial branches are reactive. Rather than being equipped for “active
resolution,” the judiciary is designed to answer questions that are posed to
it.61 It waits for controversies to arise instead of stirring them. There is a range
of possibilities for how narrowly or broadly federal judges might draft their
opinions. The respective merits of those approaches are beside the point for
present purposes. Whether an individual judge sweeps broadly or narrowly
or treads lightly or heavily in a particular opinion, she always needs to wait
for cases to come to her. That is the nature of the judicial role as envisioned
by Article III.
B. Continuity and Independence
The judiciary’s distinctiveness is underscored by its independence.
Federal judges and Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate,62 but that is where the political process stops. Article III
provides that judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.”63 And
58

See id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
60
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
61
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
62
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law . . . .”); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (“Our Founders vested authority
to appoint federal judges in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and entrusted those
judges to hold their offices during good behavior.”).
63
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
59
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their compensation “shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.”64 Salary protection is the corollary of life tenure, reflecting the
concern that “a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his
will.”65 The Justices accordingly receive something like a “constitutional
birthright” to resolve cases without worrying about political pressures.66
Permanence of appointment does not just help judges to be independent,
though it certainly does that.67 It also gives courts a sense of stability that is
both notable and distinctive. The Supreme Court is a resonant example. The
Court’s membership can remain unchanged even as presidents, senators, and
congressional representatives come and go. Congress is remade every two
years, but Article III “envisions the [Supreme] Court as a continuous body.”68
This institutional continuity suggests a sense of stability and consistency that
is difficult to square with a regime in which the Court is free to treat each
day as a blank page.69
Through its grant of life tenure, the Constitution casts judging as a
unique form of decisionmaking that must be protected from electoral and
official control. Judges resolve disputes by their best lights irrespective of
the contingencies of the political moment. Were federal judges exercising
the same species of power as the political branches, there would be an
argument for making them responsive to legislative, executive, or popular
direction. American constitutional law rejects that understanding of what
judges do.70 As Chief Justice Roberts recently explained in discussing the
Constitution’s origins, concerns about legislative interference with the courts
“created the ‘sense of a sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the
64

Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis removed); see also id. (“[W]e can never
hope to see realized in practice the complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, in any
system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter.”).
66
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1951 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
67
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If, then, the courts of justice are to be
considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration
will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute
so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance
of so arduous a duty.”).
68
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES
WE LIVE BY 234 (2012).
69
Cf. id. at 234 (“Given the Court’s clear constitutional design, today’s justices may properly give
past Court decisions a rebuttable presumption of correctness.”). As I will explain, I contend that this
argument actually goes further, not just empowering but requiring today’s Justices to afford a presumption
of deference to past decisions.
70
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (“The Framers of our Constitution
lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and judicial powers, which had been
prevalent in the colonies long before the Revolution, and which after the Revolution had produced
factional strife and partisan oppression.”).
65
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judicial power.’”71 The framers responded with an independent power that
resides in the judiciary alone.72 By separating “the legislative power to make
general law from the judicial power to apply that law in particular cases,” the
framers found their “constitutional equilibrium.”73
Federal judges do not enjoy complete insulation under the Constitution.
Article III states that judges hold their offices during good behavior,74
arguably implying that certain types of ill behavior are beyond the pale. But
the requirement of good behavior makes little difference if there is no penalty
for being bad. While the constitutional basis for such a penalty has provoked
debate,75 at present there is a widely held belief within American legal culture
that impeachment is the sole means of removing Article III judges.76
What if this belief is wrong? What if the Good Behavior Clause is
properly understood as allowing Congress or the courts to remove individual
judges, even Supreme Court Justices?77 The specter of removal would
provide an independent source of constraint, diluting the need for other
tools—such as the doctrine of stare decisis—to serve that function. But in
determining the extent of dilution, much would depend on the capaciousness
with which good behavior were defined and the sorts of reasons that were
deemed relevant to assessing a judge’s conduct.78 In all events, the prevailing
71

Sharif, 135 S. Ct. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 221).
Cf. Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at 1595 (“The Article III ‘judicial Power’
means that federal judges must be free to decide cases on the merits, without Congress telling them how
to come out on a given case or particular issue or placing a thumb on the scale in favor of one or another
decisional outcome.”).
73
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 224.
74
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
75
Compare Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How To Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE
L.J. 72, 77 (2006) (“[T]he Constitution adopted the then-established view that officers with goodbehavior tenure forfeited their offices upon a finding of misbehavior in the ordinary courts.”), with Martin
H. Redish, Response: Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the Foundations of American
Constitutionalism, 116 YALE L.J. 139, 141 (2006) (“[B]y substantially expanding the ability of the
political branches to remove, and therefore intimidate, members of the federal judiciary, the PrakashSmith proposal seriously endangers the ability of the independent federal courts to police the
constitutional excesses of the political branches and to protect individual rights from majoritarian
incursion.”), and James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2007)
(arguing that the Constitution “assign[s] the task of removing federal judges to the Senate after an
impeachment trial and thereby implicitly but unavoidably foreclos[es] alternative methods of removal”).
76
See generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author); see also Prakash & Smith, supra note 75, at 74 (“It is
a virtually unquestioned assumption among constitutional law cognoscenti that impeachment is the only
means of removing a federal judge.”).
77
See Prakash & Smith, supra note 75, at 134 (arguing that “Congress, using its ‘necessary and
proper’ powers, could enact legislation providing for judicial proceedings to remove judges”).
78
Cf. Redish, supra note 75, at 145 (arguing that the account of good behavior removal developed
by Professors Prakash and Smith does not fully explain whether removal is available based on “judicial
interpretation of the Constitution in a manner found offensive, inaccurate, or politically unacceptable by
72
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understanding of the Good Behavior Clause as reflecting an unenforceable
aspiration does not seem to be in any imminent jeopardy. For the foreseeable
future, the removal of judges will occur, if at all, exclusively through the
impeachment process.
Speaking of impeachment: That process is triggered only by “Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”79 Notwithstanding
various debates about the scope of the impeachment power, the prevailing
wisdom is that being wrong about the law is not enough to get a federal judge
impeached.80 Life tenure and salary protection push federal judges far along
the spectrum toward political insulation. The possibility of impeachment, at
least as presently understood, brings them back just a few steps.
C. Impersonality and Stability Through Constraint
The Supreme Court Justice who is granted life tenure and insulated
from political pressures faces the question of what considerations she should
keep in mind.81 One concern is that independence might lead a Justice to
behave in an unprincipled way. But as I suggested above, even if the Justices
make their decisions in good faith and in a principled fashion, independence
allows them to take very different approaches depending on their respective
judicial philosophies.
Assuming that the Constitution does not require a particular approach
to legal interpretation—an assumption reflected in the Supreme Court’s case
law, though subject to debate—it is understandable that each Justice will
make her own inquiry into the proper ends and means of constitutional

members of Congress or the President”); Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, Reply:
(Mis)Understanding Good-Behavior Tenure, 116 YALE L.J. 159, 162 (2006) (“[I]t is perfectly clear that
Congress cannot provide that judges will be ousted merely because Congress (or the President) disagrees
with their judgments. . . . Although Congress cannot provide that judges should be removed for deciding
a case incorrectly, it surely can provide for the removal of judges who decide cases through fortunetelling and séances. Judges who use these methodologies are guilty of misbehavior.”).
79
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
80
See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE FEDERALIST IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 312 (2015) (“More than two centuries since [Samuel] Chase’s acquittal,
Congress has never again tried to impeach a federal judge for ideological reasons.”); WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 114 (1992) (describing Samuel Chase’s acquittal as establishing “the
independence of federal judges from congressional oversight of the decisions they made in the cases that
came before them”).
81
See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 238 (2006) [hereinafter VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY] (“There
can be no general answer to the questions how judges will behave or what they will value once they are
freed from the blunt pressures toward reappointment, reelection, or financial security that affect many
other types of officials.”).
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interpretation.82 There are limits, of course; we might properly deem it
unlawful for a Justice to reach conclusions via coin flip. But it is much harder
to say the same about prominent (though competing) interpretive theories
such as originalism and living constitutionalism. The analysis is complicated
further by the fact that it is not one Justice who makes decisions for the
Supreme Court, but nine, and many more if we treat the Court as an enduring
institution that maintains its identity over time. That raises the possibility
that competent, principled Justices will give careful attention to an issue and
nevertheless reach different results precisely because they begin from
different methodological and normative premises. This risk is present even
when judges are subject to removal, but it is heightened by the “liberat[ing]”
effect of life tenure and salary protection.83 Hopefully, interpretive diversity
ends up strengthening the Court.84 Even so, pluralism can make it more
challenging for the Justices to find common ground.
Deferring to precedent is a way of reducing reliance on “the proclivities
of individuals.”85 In his account of the common law, Blackstone described
judges issuing decisions “according to the law of the land,” which they
master through “experience and study” and “being long personally
accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors.”86 For him,
abiding by precedent was the “established rule.”87 The contrary approach,
which allows the “scale of justice” to “waver with every new judge’s
opinion,” risks the subordination of general principles to the individual
judge’s “private sentiments.”88 There are similar themes in Hamilton’s
statement that “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents.”89 Those “rules and precedents” are what “define and point out

82
See Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis and the Selection Effect, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 128–29 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013).
83
See VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 81, at 238.
84
ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 161 (2011) (describing the argument
that “on a multi-member court, the marginal benefits of having more of a given type of judge decline
systematically, implying that a diversity of judicial types is best”).
85
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
86
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68–69; see also Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 682
(1999) (describing Blackstone’s writings as reflecting the view that “a coherent doctrine of precedent
cannot invite a de novo reexamination of whether the legal analysis in a prior decision conforms to the
current judge’s view of the proper approach to the problem”).
87
BLACKSTONE, supra note 86, at *69.
88
Id. Blackstone noted that deference to precedent is not absolute, and he identified situations in
which overrulings are appropriate. See id. at *69–70.
89
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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[judges’] duty in every particular case that comes before them.”90 Adams
likewise described precedent as a safeguard against the “arbitrary Will or
uninformed Reason of Prince or Judge.”91 And Madison’s writings suggest a
view that “the judicial oath provides no basis for adoption of the judge’s
individual understandings of a constitutional provision at the expense of
precedent.”92
What about Justices who are deciding cases of first impression? One
might wonder whether presumptive deference to precedent, in its zeal to
constrain subsequent jurists, leaves the initial deciders unconstrained.93 This
objection is a powerful one, and it warrants serious consideration. Yet I
believe it can be answered.
First and foremost, the text of the Constitution remains a constraint on
Justices who are deciding cases of first impression. Constitutional text is
sometimes uncertain, leaving room for the exercise of discretion—which is
a point to which I will return shortly. Even so, the text creates limits, and
those limits must be respected. Second, all Justices, whether deciding cases
of first impression or considering an applicable precedent, bring to bear
certain views about the role of the Court and the province of the judiciary.
Those views include attitudes toward judicial restraint. The doctrine of stare
decisis presents no bar to Justices’ taking a restrained approach to
constitutional decisionmaking in cases of first impression based on their
beliefs about the nature of adjudication, their understandings of Article III
and its implications for the exercise of the judicial power, or their practical
concerns about sweeping too broadly. Third, Justices face norms of reasongiving that treat certain types of rationales and analogies as suspect within
the broader legal culture. That creates an “argumentative burden” of
explanation.94

90
Id.; cf. Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1095 (2003) (“[P]recedents mattered in the common-law jurisprudence
of the time of the founding. It was largely common ground that they should serve as a meaningful check
on judicial discretion—a judge had a legal obligation to follow an on-point precedent within his
jurisdiction unless he could produce a good legal reason not to do so.”).
91
1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 167 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961).
92
Lee, supra note 86, at 711.
93
Professor Paulsen raises a related, though distinct, point when he asks, “If the premise that supports
a theory of stare decisis is that the judges have the power to bring meaning to the Constitution, then why
don’t today’s judges have the same power to bring or give meaning to the Constitution?” Paulsen,
Intrinsically Corrupting Influence, supra note 30, at 292.
94
Cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 586–87 (1987) (“[T]he law . . . relies
significantly on social and linguistic categories drawn from its larger environment. However contingent
these categories may be in that larger culture, a court at least bears an argumentative burden if it wishes
to depart from these categories.”).
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It might be countered that these same pressures would confront Justices
in subsequent cases if there were no doctrine of stare decisis. And, indeed,
that is true. But there is an important distinction between resolving a case of
first impression and overruling a precedent. The former represents the
unavoidable filling out of the constitutional framework; the latter, the
reshaping of constitutional law and the reconsideration of putatively durable
constitutional principles. To ensure that constitutional law remains
impersonal and stable even when the text makes multiple readings available,
we need to pay attention to the reasons for initiating a change. If judicial
changes are justified by nothing more than reasonable disagreement between
the Justices of yesterday and the Justices of today, there is a cost to the
stability and impersonality of constitutional doctrine.95
This does not mean overrulings are forbidden; the Supreme Court has
left no doubt that the doctrine of stare decisis allows overrulings under
appropriate circumstances. The point of the doctrine is not to freeze the
world in time but to place some limits on judicial change.96 To return to
Blackstone, the idea—which is applicable to the common law context
Blackstone described as well as the interpretation of a constitution whose
language is often framed in fairly general terms—is that the “scale of justice”
should not be “liable to waiver with every new judge’s opinion,” even if the
new judge is acting in good faith and in a principled manner.97 One
consequence, as we have seen, is to give the Justices more flexibility in cases
of first impression than they might have in subsequent cases when an
applicable precedent is on the books. But the rationale is not to privilege the
views of Justices from days gone by. It is to protect established constitutional
principles, which draw on judicial opinions as well as the Constitution’s text,
from excessive vacillation based on mere disagreement.
Precedent, then, is a way of drawing together and guiding differently
minded judges and Justices. The Constitution creates a Supreme Court, not
a loose assemblage of individual decisionmakers. The primacy of the
institution over the individual shapes the “rule of law underlying our own

95
See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 7–
8 (2004) (“Unless doctrine persists, unless doctrine itself is prolonged, it cannot sufficiently order social
action. The Constitution promises that kind of persistence, and it can only deliver if its commands are
instantiated in doctrines that persist.”).
96
Cf. Lee, supra note 86, at 666 (“On one hand, the framing generation perceived the importance of
stability and certainty in the law, and thus embraced a rule of following past decisions. On the other hand,
a declaratory understanding of the common law gave rise to an exception permitting some form of
reexamination of the merits of a prior decision.”).
97
BLACKSTONE, supra note 86, at *69.
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Constitution.”98 That rule-of-law ideal provides that every Justice should
“think of himself not as an individual charged with deciding cases but as a
member of a court.”99 The aspiration is genuine “impersonality” even among
Justices who have different approaches to legal interpretation and whose
employment is guaranteed regardless of official and electoral pressures.100
Having nine principled Justices is a start, but it is not enough if each one is
committed to a different principle. A collective dedication to precedent can
help the institution become something more than the individuals who
comprise it.101
There is one other feature of the Constitution that warrants mention in
any discussion of legal change. In Article V, the Constitution sets forth an
amendment protocol initiated by the actions of Congress or state
legislatures.102 One might wonder whether this tells us anything about how
judicial precedent should work. In particular, perhaps the amendment
process implies that judges and Justices have no power to effect genuine
constitutional change, meaning that judicial decisions should always be
viewed as subject to reconsideration in a way the Constitution is not—except
through the mechanisms of Article V.
This inference is entirely consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis,
which acknowledges that judicial precedents must yield in ways and for
reasons that the constitutional text does not. Moreover, even where the
Supreme Court opts not to revisit its precedents, the ultimate power of
constitutional revision always belongs to the people acting through Article
V. The existence of Article V would not seem to present any challenge to the
argument that the constitutional blueprint suggests the need for presumptive
deference to Supreme Court precedents. That frees us to focus on other
features such as the distinctiveness of judicial power, the implications of

98
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); see also Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that the “greatest purpose” of the
doctrine of stare decisis is “to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law”).
99
Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1,
21 (2012) (“[The subsequent judge] shares with his fellow judges, including [the precedent judge], the
responsibility of seeing that cases that come before the court are decided on the basis of the rule of law.”).
100
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 569 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting
“[t]he desirability of promoting genuine impersonality of decision by minimizing the elements of personal
discretion, and of facilitating the operation of the check of professional criticism”).
101
On the role of precedent in helping courts to operate as institutions rather than combinations of
individuals, see RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 99–103 (2017).
102
U.S. CONST. art. V.
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judicial independence, and the uncertainty of constitutional text in numerous
respects—the latter of which I will now discuss.103
D. Textual Indeterminacy
The Constitution was always going to need interpreting.104 There are
many specifics, of course. Two senators clearly means two senators,105 just
like thirty-five years old clearly means thirty-five years old.106 And even
when it does not resolve a question completely, the Constitution provides
guidance. For instance, while the precise scope of the Ex Post Facto Clauses
is debatable, the Clauses pretty clearly set some limits on legal
retroactivity.107
Yet the Constitution also leaves numerous questions unanswered.108 It
is a relatively brief document, and it describes key concepts like “the
freedom of speech” and “due process of law” at high levels of generality.
That generality creates substantial work for judges in applying constitutional
commands to concrete disputes. Uncertainty remains even if one deems it

103

It is also possible to contend that Article III implies presumptive deference to precedent through
its distinction between the Supreme Court and inferior courts. Consider the argument that Article III’s
creation of a hierarchical federal judiciary implies an obligation on behalf of lower federal courts to follow
Supreme Court decisions. See JAMES E. PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY,
AND THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 41 (2009) (concluding that “the Framers’ very
conception of a unitary and hierarchical, rather than a plural and horizontal, judiciary presupposed a duty
on the part of lower courts to obey their superior”). One might extend the argument to suggest that
Supreme Court decisions are best understood as presumptively binding as a general matter, even when
the Supreme Court itself is asked to reconsider them. On that understanding, the key difference between
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts would be that the former possesses the power to rebut the
presumption of deference while the latter do not; the presumption would remain the same. I am not (yet,
at least) confident about whether and to what extent this argument might bolster the constitutional case
for stare decisis in the Supreme Court. But regardless of whether it supports the constitutional foundations
of precedent, the argument does nothing to challenge the account I have developed in this Part.
104
See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“Those who ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain
ambiguities.”).
105
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
106
See id. art. II, § 1.
107
See id. art. I, §§ 9–10.
108
As Professor Solum notes, “the Constitution includes a number of general, abstract, and vague
phrases—‘freedom of speech,’ ‘legislative power,’ and so forth. The constitutional doctrines that are
associated with the phrases have legal content that is richer than the communicative content of the
provisions in which the phrases occur.” Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 501 (2013); see also AMAR, supra note 68, at 208 (“Because terseness is
necessary, the document is importantly and intentionally underspecified. Judicial doctrine helps fill in the
gaps, translating the Constitution’s broad dictates into law that works in court, in keeping with the vision
of Article III.”).
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appropriate to invoke supplemental principles of interpretation derived from
the Constitution itself109 or from the common law.110
The Constitution’s text is thus indeterminate in important respects.111 It
is important to note the threshold question of what, exactly, we mean by
indeterminate.112 For example, concluding that a constitutional provision is
indeterminate whenever it does not answer a question beyond a reasonable
doubt will have different implications from treating a provision as
indeterminate only when no reading is supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.113 This is a general problem of constitutional jurisprudence, and it
need not detain us here. The important point for present purposes is that the
application of constitutional provisions will often (though not always) be at
least somewhat uncertain. The question is how Supreme Court Justices
should proceed in the face of that uncertainty.114

109

A possible example is the Ninth Amendment, which provides that “[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
U.S. CONST. amend. IX. For an argument that the Ninth Amendment provides interpretive guidance to
constitutional decisionmakers, see Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment,
93 IOWA L. REV. 801, 806 (2008) (describing an historical account of the Ninth Amendment as “an active
federalist provision that calls upon courts to limit the interpretation of enumerated federal power in order
to preserve the people’s retained right to local self-government”). For another recent take, see Ryan C.
Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 501 (2011) (“The
plain language of the Ninth Amendment prohibits one, and only one, particular form of constitutional
argument—that because some particular right or set of rights is mentioned in the Constitution, some other
claimed right or set of rights should either be ‘denied’ . . . or ‘disparaged’ . . . .”).
110
See Baude & Sachs, supra note 5, at 1120 (arguing that “there are lots of . . . places where
constitutional interpretation relies on [general] law to fill the gaps”); see also id. (“[W]e look to unwritten
law to identify the Constitution’s legal force and the object of constitutional interpretation.”).
111
As noted above, here I will use indeterminate as synonymous with underdeterminate, though the
two terms are sometimes used to mean different things. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 15 at 41 (“We can
say that a legal text is completely indeterminate with respect to a set of possible applications if the rule
corresponding to the text produces outcomes for none of the applications of the set. . . . We can say that
a legal text is underdeterminate with respect to an application set if the rule corresponding to the text
produces outcomes for some but not all of the applications in the set.”).
112
See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411,
413–14 (1996) (“[O]nce we have gathered up and analyzed all of the available uncertainties regarding a
question, we still have to ask whether those uncertainties are enough to make the question indeterminate.
Or put another way, we need to know how uncertain one must be about an answer before one ought to
throw up one’s hands and pronounce the question indeterminate.”).
113
See GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS 122 (2017) (“There are
almost always better and worse answers, even when there are no good answers. . . . [I]f the correct
standard of proof for meaning is very high, then a relatively modest amount of vagueness or ambiguity is
enough to foreclose interpretative determinacy and potentially open the field quite broadly to
construction.”).
114
The study of potential responses to semantic uncertainty in the Constitution’s text is sometimes
described in terms of constitutional construction. There is a robust body of work on the legitimacy and
dynamics of constitutional construction. For an introduction, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM. L. REV. 453 (2013).
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One answer is that so long as the constitutional text makes a particular
answer more likely to be correct, even by a sliver, than all others, the Justices
should endorse it.115 Yet we can also imagine other judicial responses when
a case is close. For example, a Justice faced with a close case might apply a
default rule that denies the existence of federal power and reaffirms the
presumptive authority of the states.116 That approach could be driven by “the
fundamental constitutional principle of enumerated federal powers” and
“unenumerated state powers.”117 Alternatively, doubts might be resolved by
upholding the exercise of legislative authority absent a clear prohibition
against the act in question.118 Another possibility is that courts should fall
back on a presumption in favor of individual liberty that forbids
governmental action without a clear constitutional basis.119 Such a
“presumption of liberty” might arise from sources including the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which can be read (the
argument goes) as putting “the burden on the government to establish the
necessity and propriety of any infringement on individual freedom.”120
Arguments grounded in historical practice can be framed in comparable
terms. For example, when the Supreme Court interpreted the Recess
Appointments Clause in NLRB v. Noel Canning, it put “significant weight
upon historical practice.”121 We can think of Noel Canning as offering
another potential response to textual uncertainty: When in doubt, the Court
115
Cf. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 142 (describing an approach for resolving
situations “[w]hen the interpretation of language was unclear” by considering “the relevant originalist
evidence—evidence based on text, structure, history, and intent—and select[ing] the interpretation that
was supported more strongly by that evidence”).
116
See Gary Lawson, Classical Liberal Constitution or Classical Liberal Construction?, 8 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 808, 835–36 (2014).
117
Id. at 835; see also id. at 835–36 (“Anyone claiming the benefit of an exercise of federal power
must be asserting in the first instance that such power is authorized by the Constitution; otherwise, that
exercise of power has no legal status. . . . In the case of challenges to state authority under the federal
Constitution, precisely the opposite burden of proof applies.”).
118
See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (arguing for the invalidation of legislation as unconstitutional only
“when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very
clear one”); cf. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 36 (1999) (arguing that originalism cannot “embrace James
Bradley Thayer’s strong form of judicial deference as a necessary component. . . . [W]hen the
Constitution is knowable, the Court must act vigorously to enforce the limits it places on governmental
action.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 232 n.82 (“Rather than a ‘clear mistake’ rule, perhaps an
originalist Court should adopt something more closely approaching a ‘preponderance of the evidence’
rule to strike down laws on originalist grounds.”).
119
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
259–60 (2004).
120
Id.
121
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014).
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should refrain from disturbing longstanding practices of the political
branches.
To these possible responses to textual uncertainty, I propose adding one
more: deference to judicial precedent. This understanding has deep roots in
American constitutional history. To Madison, the meaning of the
Constitution would need to “be liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications.”122 Caleb Nelson characterizes
Madison’s writings and other Founding-Era documents as suggesting that
“[o]nce the meaning of an ambiguous provision had been ‘liquidate[d]’ by a
sufficiently deliberate course of legislative or judicial decisions, future actors
were generally bound to accept the settled interpretation even if they would
have chosen a different one as an original matter.”123 According to Professor
Nelson, the obligation to follow precedent was relaxed when “a prior
construction went beyond the range of indeterminacy.”124 Precedent serves
to limit “the discretion that legal indeterminacy would otherwise give
judges.”125 The result is “to ‘fix’ the meaning of provisions that were
indeterminate when they emerged from the Philadelphia Convention.”126
The concept of liquidation extends beyond the creation of judicial
precedents. Madison used the term more broadly, predicting that political
actions would resolve some of the Constitution’s uncertainties.127 The
Supreme Court has recognized the same point. To return to NLRB v. Noel
Canning, the Court drew on Madison’s vision of liquidation when it
embraced the idea of “practice,” including practice within the political
branches, as “an important interpretive factor even when the nature or

122

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 12
(2001) [hereinafter Nelson, Stare Decisis]; see also William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent
Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1811 (2013) (“[P]ost-ratification practice can serve to give concrete
meaning to a constitutional provision even if it was vague as an original matter.”); Lee, supra note 86, at
665–66 (“[I]n Madison’s view, a precedent that is thought to expound or interpret the law or the
Constitution is worthy of deference, but once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing
the law, it should be rejected.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 941 (1985) (“[F]or Madison there could be no return to the unadorned text from
interpretations that had received the approbation of the people.”).
124
Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 123, at 14; see also id. at 11 (“Written laws, then, would have
a range of indeterminacy. Madison and his contemporaries believed that precedents would operate within
this range.”).
125
Id. at 8.
126
Nelson, Originalism, supra note 54, at 583.
127
See id. at 527 (describing Madison’s view that practices and constructions outside the judiciary
would liquidate the Constitution’s meaning).
123
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longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice
began after the founding era.”128
By settling uncertain areas of the constitutional landscape under a
system of stare decisis, judicial precedents likewise give people a firmer
basis for understanding and adapting to constitutional precepts. Liquidation
also carries benefits for the judicial branch: As compared with the
Constitution’s text alone, liquidation provides judges with a “thicker” set of
legal rules and norms to apply.129 Supreme Court decisions are full of
precedents. In countless domains of constitutional law, the “real work [is]
done by the Court’s analysis of its previous decisions.”130 Where the
Constitution does not say enough to resolve a legal question, judicial
precedents guide the inquiry. That phenomenon, I submit, is unremarkable
given the document’s sparseness and generality.
A presumption of deference to judicial precedent is compatible with
other approaches to constitutional uncertainty—for instance, a presumption
in favor of upholding legislation or in favor of protecting individual
liberty131—in cases of first impression. Differences arise only when there is
an applicable decision on the books.132 Consider a case like Citizens United
v. FEC, in which the Court departed from precedent and expanded the First
Amendment rights of corporations (and labor unions).133 Imagine that a given
Justice viewed the Constitution’s text, including the First Amendment’s
prohibition against laws “abridging the freedom of speech,” as uncertain in
its application to corporate speech. If the Justice adopted, say, a presumption
in favor of liberty, we might expect her to strike down restrictions that
interfered with such speech. If, on the other hand, the Justice employed a
practice of deferring to precedent, we would expect her to stand by (at least
presumptively) the Court’s prior decisions allowing substantial restrictions
on corporate speech.
In instances of conflict, why should any Justice opt for a presumption
of deference to precedent as opposed to a different presumption? For those
who emphasize existing practice as filling out the constitutional

128

134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014); see also id. at 2559 (“[I]n interpreting the [Recess Appointments]
Clause, we put significant weight upon historical practice.”).
129
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Conservative Case for Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 977,
980 (2008) (“[T]he legal norms that would apply in resolving disputed questions of law are much thicker
in the universe of precedent than they are in the world of originalism.”).
130
STRAUSS, supra note 15, at 33.
131
See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
132
This was not the case in Noel Canning. See 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (“We have not previously
interpreted the [Recess Appointments] Clause . . . .”).
133
See 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
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framework,134 it is important that deference to precedent is a well-established
feature of modern Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Justices continue to
describe stare decisis as carrying “fundamental importance to”135 and serving
as a “foundation stone”136 of the rule of law. For those who endorse
Madisonian notions of liquidation, it matters that the Supreme Court’s
accounts of the lawfulness and centrality of precedent have emerged over
many years in opinions joined by an array of Justices.137
To the extent one perceives the Constitution’s creation of an
independent, durable judiciary as suggesting the importance of an
impersonal Supreme Court whose decisions transcend the interpretive
tendencies of its sitting members, that is another powerful reason to view
deference to precedent as reflecting broader constitutional principles.
Precedent provides common ground between Justices who are inclined to
view the Constitution differently. This point is more than theoretical; it is
also borne out in practice, as Justices who exhibit divergent methodological
tendencies continue to describe stare decisis as an important feature of the
constitutional system.138
As we have seen, Founding Era thinkers were no strangers to the
creation and consultation of precedents. Prominent intellectuals like
Blackstone, Madison, Adams, and Hamilton discussed the role of precedent
in constraining judicial discretion. It is true that, as Professor Harrison points
out, the lack of an established system of case reports made information about
prior cases “at best unsystematic.”139 Even so, Professor Harrison notes that
“Americans at the time of the Framing expected courts generally to follow
precedent.”140 Had the founding generation been unfamiliar with the concept
of precedent, it would be more difficult to treat the Constitution as giving
rise to inferences about the role of stare decisis. But viewing the Constitution

134

See supra Section II.B.
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 623 (2016).
136
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
137
See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 348 (2009); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 (2006) (plurality opinion); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 556–57 (2002) (plurality opinion); Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
138
See supra Section II.B.
139
Harrison, supra note 21, at 521.
140
Id. at 522; see also MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 154 (“Precedent was an important
part of Anglo-American law for centuries before the enactment of the Constitution . . . .”); Lee, supra
note 86, at 683 (“The founding-era compromise seems comparable to the modern notion that only an
egregious error justifies abandoning precedent.”).
135
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against a background familiarity with precedent bolsters the case for relying
on principles of stare decisis to channel judicial discretion.141
This style of argument does not connect precedent with a single textual
anchor.142 Nor does it depend on treating background assumptions about the
common law as having survived the Constitution’s enactment (though
neither does it deny the validity of such an approach). Finally, I do not
contend that the founding generation held a universal view of stare decisis
as a tool for enhancing legal continuity notwithstanding disagreements
among judges over time. My point, rather, is that the seeds of such an
understanding were present in the writings of some key commentators,
informing the inferences that can be drawn from the Constitution’s text and
structure.143
E. Synthesis
In the foregoing Sections, I have emphasized the Constitution’s
protection of judicial independence, its conception of courts as enduring and
stable, and its nature as a relatively brief charter that is uncertain in numerous
respects. I have argued that those features are best understood as implying
that Supreme Court decisions should receive presumptive deference going
forward as a means of filling out the constitutional framework. That is
especially true given background understandings of precedent as a check on
individual discretion—understandings that were there at the founding and
remain resonant to this day. Taken in combination, these points support the
inference that deference to precedent is a constitutional principle.
The Supreme Court has made these sorts of inferences before. When
the Court examined the contours of state sovereign immunity in Alden v.
Maine, it followed what it found to be the most “natural inference” from the
Constitution’s “history and structure.”144 Likewise, when it struck down
provisions of federal law in Printz v. United States, the Court relied in part
on “the structure of the Constitution” and its “‘essential postulate[s]’” as
141

See Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 123, at 9 (arguing that concerns about excessive discretion
“shaped most antebellum explanations of the need for stare decisis”).
142
It is possible to view my account of precedent as complementing arguments that are grounded in
the judicial power—arguments that I discussed in Part I. The rationale would be that the textual,
contextual, and structural features I have discussed strengthen the case for interpreting the judicial power
as encompassing an obligation of fidelity to precedent. I certainly have no objection to such an approach,
but my argument does not depend on reading the judicial power in that way; it is available even to those
who are skeptical of giving the judicial power such a prominent role in establishing the legitimacy of
deference.
143
This link with the Constitution responds to the argument that “[a]ny reliance on precedent that
does not ultimately trace to getting the right answer to constitutional questions exceeds the boundaries of
the judiciary’s authority and is itself unconstitutional.” Lawson, supra note 45, at 40.
144
527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999).

818

112:789 (2017)

Precedent and Constitutional Structure

barring Congress from requiring state and local officials to take various
actions relating to background checks for handgun buyers.145 And in Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Court invalidated a law requiring judges to reopen
certain cases as being “repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of
Article III.”146 The Court’s willingness to make inferences from the
constitutional blueprint in cases like these bolsters the argument for
conceptualizing stare decisis in comparable terms.
F. Deference in the Lower Federal Courts
Precedent is important to lower courts just as it is to the Supreme Court.
Lower courts cite precedents all the time. They pay special attention to
Supreme Court decisions, often construing them broadly and deferring to
dicta and holdings alike.147 But while prior decisions play a central role in
lower court opinions, it does not necessarily follow that the rules of
precedent should operate the same way as they do in the Supreme Court. Nor
does it follow that the constitutional implications generalize across both
contexts.
The Supreme Court works without a safety net. If it makes a mistake,
there is no one to review its decisions, as captured in Justice Jackson’s
famous statement that “we are infallible only because we are final.”148 Of
course, the people can respond in other ways. Congress can react to the
Supreme Court’s failure to protect a right by enacting legislation, and in
extreme cases a supermajority can band together to pass a constitutional
amendment. Still, there is no superior court authorized to reconsider the
Supreme Court’s decisions. Constraint needs to come from the Justices’
internal practices—practices that include deferring to precedent.
The situation is different in the lower courts. When a district court
decides a case, its faces the prospect that a superior court may overrule it. So
do circuit courts. Different judges will have different responses to the threat
of superior-court reversal, but as a general matter lower courts know their
work is being watched by someone with the power to undo it. The prospect
of superior-court review, coupled with the existence of precedents from
145
521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322
(1934)).
146
514 U.S. 211, 217–18 (1995); see also id. at 218–19 (“Article III establishes a ‘judicial
department’ with the ‘province and duty . . . to say what the law is’ in particular cases and
controversies. . . . By retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress
has violated this fundamental principle.”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
147
See Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 198 (2014) [hereinafter
Kozel, Scope of Precedent].
148
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
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those same superior courts, serves a unifying function. Moreover,
constitutional interpretations by inferior courts are by their nature subject to
further consideration as the appellate process runs its course. Only rulings of
the Supreme Court represent the final word of the judicial department on the
meaning of the Constitution. Those rulings have a unique resonance within
the system the Constitution created.
The analysis might change if Congress were (politically) willing and
(constitutionally) able to remove the Supreme Court’s power to review
certain categories of federal cases. The asserted source of Congress’s
authority to take such action presumably would be Article III’s Exceptions
and Regulations Clause.149 While there is substantial debate about the
Clause’s proper interpretation,150 on some readings it creates the possibility
that Congress might “make decisions by inferior federal courts final” by
insulating them from Supreme Court review.151 Suffice to say that if such a
scenario came to pass, there would be a strong argument for extending the
constitutional defense of stare decisis to the decisions of whichever lower
court was effectively given the power to render final decisions
notwithstanding its constitutionally “inferior” status.152
Yet even on the assumption that Congress may use the Exceptions and
Regulations Clause to give inferior courts the last word on federal law, the
Constitution’s “default rule” accords that authority to the Supreme Court.153
That unique power and duty raises the possibility that the doctrine of stare
decisis might operate differently in the Supreme Court than it does in other
tribunals. I am not prepared to say—and do not have space to explore—
whether that definitively is the case, but the possibility alone is enough to
suggest that the prudent course is to focus first on analyzing stare decisis at
the Supreme Court without making generalizations that might turn out to be,
at the very least, complicated.
III. PRECEDENT AND DOCTRINAL COMPOSITION
If stare decisis is a constitutional principle, the Supreme Court is
justified in treating constitutional decisions as entitled to presumptive
149
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.”).
150
See, e.g., PFANDER, supra note 103, at 7–10 (discussing key areas of scholarly debate over the
interpretation of the Exceptions and Regulations Clause).
151
Harrison, supra note 21, at 514; see also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 230 (1985).
152
See PFANDER, supra note 103, at 29 (highlighting “the fact that Article III specifies that any
federal courts Congress creates must remain ‘inferior’ to the Supreme Court”).
153
See Harrison, supra note 21, at 515.
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fidelity. The Court is not absolutely required to follow precedent in any given
case. Presumptive deference is just that: presumptive. We still have plenty
of work to do in understanding how stare decisis operates in particular
disputes.
This Part moves from examining the foundations of stare decisis as a
constitutional principle to exploring the operation of stare decisis as a legal
doctrine. I take up three issues that are crucial in defining the role of
precedent: the nature of the presumption of deference accorded to judicial
decisions, the strength of that presumption, and the scope of a judicial
decision as it applies to future disputes.
A. Presumption of Deference
My characterization of stare decisis as a constitutional inference is
based in part on the phenomenon of textual uncertainty: it was evident from
the beginning, and it remains evident today, that the Constitution’s text does
not clearly resolve every dispute. Deferring to prior decisions is a way of
filling out the constitutional framework while promoting stability and
impersonality. Still, to the extent we are focused on uncertainty, the question
arises whether the presumption of deference should extend to areas where
the Constitution’s text is clear.
I think the answer is generally yes, for reasons both practical and
conceptual. On the practical side, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
will render many decisions that undisputedly misconstrue clear
constitutional text. If it were to do so, there would be no call for deference
going forward; an opinion that interprets “two Senators” to mean “five
Senators” is not worth taking seriously, much less treating with deference.154
But clarity is not always so clear. What we are more likely to be talking about
are situations in which various Justices disagree about whether a particular
provision is clear, or situations in which they agree that a provision is clear
but part ways over what it clearly means.
That brings me to the conceptual point. Especially given the sparseness
and occasional abstraction of the Constitution’s text, it is inevitable that
different Justices will sometimes reach different conclusions about both the
154
The question of what exactly makes the “two Senators” example an “easy case,” in Professor
Schauer’s words, is interesting. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). It
obviously begins with textual specificity. But Professor Schauer contends that even seemingly clear text
can lead to difficult cases due to tension between a rule’s clear language and evident purpose, conflict
between two different rules that each have some claim to applicability, or morally uncomfortable results.
See id. at 415–16. However one views Professor Schauer’s statement that “language alone is insufficient
to generate an easy case,” id. at 416, the point remains that there are some constitutional issues on which
there is no meaningful dispute, certainly because of clear constitutional text and arguably for other reasons
as well.

821

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

document’s clarity and its meaning. Again, this is not always true; as thenJudge Roberts noted during his confirmation hearing, “If the phrase in the
Constitution says two-thirds of the Senate, everybody’s a literalist when they
interpret that.”155 But in other situations, there will be differences of opinion
about what the Constitution says and whether the Constitution clearly says
it. Those differences of opinion will flow in part from different perspectives
about the sources that are relevant to interpreting the constitutional provision
in question.156 This was always destined to be the case, from the time of the
founding until today.
It accordingly seems problematic to insist on a principle of presumptive
deference that arises only after making a threshold determination of whether
a provision is clear. Such an approach would bear similarities to the Chevron
doctrine of administrative law, pursuant to which judicial deference to
agencies depends on the absence of statutory clarity.157 But regardless of the
soundness of relying so heavily on perceived clarity in applying the Chevron
doctrine, in the administrative context we are talking about judicial review
of administrative decisionmaking. The dynamics are different when it comes
to Supreme Court precedent; the question is whether today’s Justices ought
to defer to a decision of yesterday’s Court. A presumption of deference
infuses the Court’s rulings with durability, and it pushes back against the
idea that the Constitution is remade with every new appointment. In so doing,
the presumption of deference responds to Hamilton’s concerns about
“arbitrary discretion,” Blackstone’s worries about judges’ “private
sentiments,” and Madison’s recognition that the Constitution’s ambiguities
would need to be liquidated over time.158
As a constitutional principle, then, stare decisis is best understood as
general in its application. At the same time, my argument would not prevent
a Justice from finding the presumption of deference to be rebutted if she
concluded that a precedent misconstrued a clear constitutional provision.159
155

Hearing, supra note 26, at 159.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text,
64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1216–17 (2015) (“[T]he perceived clarity of the text is not only a product of typical
‘plain meaning’ considerations such as dictionary definitions and linguistic conventions. Rather, such
perceived clarity can also be affected by a variety of other considerations . . . . includ[ing] reasoning about
the purpose of a constitutional provision, structural inferences, understandings of the national ethos,
consequentialist considerations, customary practice, and precedent.”).
157
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). On the
relationship between Chevron-type review and stare decisis, see generally Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra
note 123.
158
See supra notes 88–89, 122 and accompanying text.
159
See Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 123, at 14 (“[I]f, after giving precedents the benefit of the
doubt, subsequent interpreters remained convinced that a prior construction went beyond the range of
indeterminacy, they did not have to treat it as a valid gloss on the law.”).
156
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(Given that my focus is on principles of constitutional structure, I take no
position on whether certain interpretations of provisions such as Article III’s
judicial power might create independent barriers to overruling.160) That is,
the presumption of deference is general, but some Justices might
nevertheless find it to be rebutted in situations of perceived constitutional
clarity. I have concerns about such an approach, but as I will explain in the
next Section, those concerns are properly understood as conceptual rather
than constitutional.
B. Strength of Deference
Presumptive deference means a Supreme Court decision cannot be
overruled simply because five Justices have come to disagree with it.
Consider, for example, a situation in which five Justices review a precedent
and find it to be competently and impressively reasoned. They also think the
precedent deals with a question that is quite difficult on the merits. Yet they
ultimately conclude that the slightly better argument is on the other side of
the issue, meaning that the relevant precedent is wrong.
Without more, this is not enough to rebut the presumptive deference
owed to Supreme Court precedents. As Justice Kagan has noted, the “very
point of stare decisis” is that the reasons for “revers[ing] an opinion must go
beyond demonstrations (much less assertions) that it was wrong.”161 That is
what the Court means when it demands a “special justification” before
overruling its prior decisions.162 A Justice’s conclusion that she would have
decided a case differently is not enough to warrant an overruling. If it were,
any constraining effect of precedent would vanish. Stare decisis means more
than looking to prior decisions for their persuasive value. It entails a
presumption of deference even to decisions that today’s Justices view as
incorrect.
That, however, is where my constitutional argument ends. I suggested
in Part II that the constitutional framework is best understood as supporting
presumptive deference to Supreme Court opinions. I have now added that
rebutting the presumption requires more than mere disagreement. Within
these bounds, we can imagine numerous permissible formulations of the
doctrine of stare decisis. Selecting among those formulations is not a matter
160

On the relationship between precedent and the Article III judicial power, see supra Section I.A.
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
162
Id. at 2651; see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014) (“[T]his
Court has always held that ‘any departure’ from the doctrine [of stare decisis] ‘demands special
justification.’” (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984))); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (reaffirming the “view repeated in our cases” that “a decision to
overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly
decided”).
161
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of deriving rules from the Constitution itself. Rather, it is a matter of
common law decisionmaking under the authority of the Supreme Court.
Specific rules will emerge from the Court’s development and application of
the common law of precedent.163 (Whether Congress also has a role to play
in fleshing out the doctrine of stare decisis is a question I will discuss in Part
IV, below.)
Thus, while the Constitution requires a presumption of deference, it
does not answer the distinct question of how that presumption can be
rebutted. Even so, some approaches are more consistent than others with the
notions of constraint and impersonality that give the doctrine of stare decisis
its resonance. For example, certain bases for overruling pose relatively little
danger to the ability of precedent to serve as a stabilizing force and a bridge
between different judges over time. The Supreme Court has recognized that
the presumption of deference can be overcome by factors such as factual
mistakes or outdated assumptions164 and problems of procedural
workability.165 Overruling for reasons like these is fully consistent with the
constitutional account of precedent that I have developed, because the
justifications for reconsideration are premised on the idea that it takes more
than disagreement to overcome the constraining force of precedent.
Other bases for overruling are more complex. Take, for instance, the
argument that precedents are subject to overruling if they were not “well
reasoned.”166 At first glance, it makes perfect sense to give the least amount
of deference to precedents that exhibit flawed reasoning. The problem is that
whether a decision was well-reasoned—or, more accurately, whether today’s
Justices perceive it as well-reasoned—tends to be bound up with whether the
precedent is viewed as right or wrong on the merits. To treat a precedent’s
weak reasoning as a basis for overruling is a form of double counting; the
justifications for deeming the precedent incorrect reemerge as bases for
jettisoning it.167 That dilutes the constraining, stabilizing effect of precedent

163
As noted above, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport likewise emphasize the distinction
between constitutional rules of precedent and supplementary rules grounded in the common law, though
their constitutional argument revolves around the judicial power. See MCG INNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra
note 29, at 168.
164
See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (noting the relevance of “whether facts have so changed, or
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”).
165
See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009) (“[T]he fact that a decision has proved
‘unworkable’ is a traditional ground for overruling it.”).
166
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362–63 (2010) (noting as a “relevant factor[] in
deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis . . . whether the decision was well reasoned”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
167
See id. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court’s central
argument for why stare decisis ought to be trumped is that it does not like [the key precedent under
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and increases the chances that constitutional law will ebb and flow with shifts
in judicial personnel—and attendant shifts in the interpretive methodologies
that enjoy primacy at any given moment.
As an alternative to considering whether a decision was well-reasoned,
the Supreme Court might limit itself to a more categorical determination of
whether the decision was within the bounds of permissible discretion. In his
illuminating analysis of constitutional liquidation, Professor Nelson
discusses this practice and draws a conceptual and historical distinction
between precedents that are wrong and those that are clearly wrong, with the
latter referring to situations in which a prior court “went beyond its
discretionary authority” and reached an outcome that was impermissible.168
The modern Supreme Court occasionally has gestured toward a comparable
distinction between clear errors and closer calls.169
Within a given interpretive school, the Justices theoretically could
distinguish between clear error and ordinary error while leaving the
constraining power of precedent intact.170 To see how, imagine an originalist
Justice who concludes that a prior decision probably misinterprets the
Constitution’s original meaning but who views the historical evidence as
uncertain and the case as close. That Justice might choose to defer to
precedent even if she is inclined to overrule other decisions whose flaws are
more obvious. The same goes for Justices who hold other interpretive
philosophies; they might abide by precedent when matters are in doubt while
departing from decisions that are clearly flawed.171
Notwithstanding its intuitive appeal, the distinction between ordinary
and clear errors faces difficulties in a world of competing theories about the
proper ends and means of constitutional interpretation. In arenas up to and
including the Supreme Court, judges embrace markedly different
interpretive philosophies and normative commitments.172 The resulting
consideration]. The opinion ‘was not well reasoned,’ our colleagues assert, and it conflicts with First
Amendment principles. This, of course, is the Court’s merits argument . . . .” (citation omitted)).
168
See Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 123, at 7.
169
See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) (including the consideration of whether a
decision “has been proved manifestly erroneous” in the stare decisis calculus).
170
For a competing perspective that challenges the use of clarity standards in the context of statutory
interpretation, see Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118
(2016) (book review) (“Several substantive principles of interpretation . . . depend on an initial
determination of whether a text is clear or ambiguous. But judges often cannot make that initial clarity
versus ambiguity decision in a settled, principled, or evenhanded way.”).
171
See Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 123, at 67 (noting the argument that “the current judges
may be committed to an entirely different interpretive method than their predecessors, and they may be
too quick to decide that their predecessors’ method was illegitimate”).
172
Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 GEO. L.J. 159, 166 (2016)
(“All nine Justices should recognize that reasonable minds can disagree about the proper approach to
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pluralism muddies attempts at distinguishing between clear error and
ordinary error. As Judge Kavanaugh noted in a recent essay on statutory
interpretation, “One judge’s clarity is another judge’s ambiguity.”173 That is
doubly true when judges are applying different interpretive rubrics. Consider
how an originalist Justice might determine whether a precedent decided on
nonoriginalist grounds is clearly wrong, as opposed to just plain wrong.174
Would she declare all nonoriginalist precedents to be not simply erroneous
but clearly erroneous? Would nonoriginalist Justices do the same when faced
with originalist precedents?
If the answer to these questions is no, difficulties arise from asking a
Justice to evaluate the application of an interpretive methodology that she
rejects.175 The challenges are even greater if the answer is yes. Assuming that
a particular Justice views all decisions that reflect an interpretive
methodology different from her own as clearly wrong, the necessity of a
special justification for overruling becomes a formality in a large swath of
cases. On some theories, the Constitution is clear when history leaves little
doubt about the original understanding of a provision. On other theories,
even compelling evidence of original meanings is not dispositive. Instead,
constitutional meaning also depends on other factors such as contemporary
values or pragmatic analysis.176 Without agreement about how to read the
Constitution, the category of “clear error” faces pressure to expand steadily,
undermining the ability of precedent to constrain individual Justices by
subordinating their personal theories to the Court’s institutional identity.
A Justice might nevertheless be constrained by the Constitution as
understood in light of her interpretive philosophy, be it originalism, living
constitutionalism, or otherwise. Indeed, I have no doubt that Justices
sometimes reach decisions they find regrettable because they feel obliged to

interpretation, at least within conventional boundaries that comfortably include self-identified textualists,
self-identified purposivists, self-identified intentionalists, and various hybrids. The federal judiciary has
always contained multiple theoretical types . . . .”).
173
Kavanaugh, supra note 170, at 2137.
174
See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1172
(2015). Professor Nelson also recognizes this point, though he expects “the number of ‘false positives’ to
remain tolerable.” See Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 123, at 67.
175
See KOZEL, supra note 101, at 120–21.
176
See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 15, at 11 (“In every generation, We the People of the United States
make the Constitution our own by calling upon its text and its principles and arguing about what they
mean in our own time.”); BREYER, supra note 20, at 81 (“The Constitution establishes political
institutions designed to ensure a workable, democratic form of government that protects basic personal
liberties; divides and separates power . . . ; ensures a degree of equality; and guarantees a rule of law.
These purposes can guide a judge’s efforts to interpret individual constitutional phrases.”); STRAUSS,
supra note 15, at 35 (describing constitutional law as developing “through the accumulation and evolution
of precedents, shaped to some degree by notions of fairness and good policy”).
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decide cases in a principled manner that is true to their vision of
constitutional law. But deference to precedent leads to the sort of constraint
that transcends methodological disputes and personal proclivities.177 Prior
decisions provide a robust and publicly accessible source of legal meaning
and bring together Justices across the philosophical spectrum.178 Deferring to
precedent is a way of mediating interpretive disagreements and promoting
decisionmaking by reference to external sources of authority.179 Those goals
are harder to achieve if Justices distinguish among precedents based on the
egregiousness of their mistakes—a distinction that raises the possibility of
discarding precedents based on little more than disagreement with the
interpretive methodology they reflect.
While there is significant value in resisting overrulings that are based
on disagreements over interpretive methodology, my constitutional account
of stare decisis does not demand such resistance. So long as the Supreme
Court recognizes a presumption of deference to prior decisions, I think it
would be perfectly lawful for the Court to treat the presumption as rebuttable
in the face of, say, clear or manifest errors. My concerns about such a practice
go to the operation of stare decisis, not to the doctrine’s constitutional
foundations.
A similar analysis extends to another factor that sometimes receives
attention in the stare decisis calculus: the harms that a flawed decision has
caused. The Supreme Court occasionally distinguishes, implicitly at least,
among flawed precedents based on the perceived gravity of their ill effects.
Citizens United v. FEC provides a useful example.180 When Chief Justice
Roberts wrote in his concurrence about the importance of reconsidering
flawed precedents, he cited decisions on issues like racial segregation,
minimum wage laws, and wiretapping.181 One potential takeaway from this
selection of examples is that precedents are in greater need of overruling
when they are not only wrong in their reasoning but detrimental in their
results.

177
Cf. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217–18 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“Although ‘judicial independence’ is often discussed in terms of independence from
external threats, the Framers understood the concept to also require independence from the ‘internal
threat’ of ‘human will.’” (quoting PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 507, 508 (2008))).
178
Cf. Merrill, supra note 129, at 980 (discussing the use of precedent to supplement constitutional
meaning).
179
See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711,
1711 (2013) (“Stare decisis purports to guide a justice’s decision whether to reverse or tolerate error, and
sometimes it does that. Sometimes, however, it functions less to handle doctrinal missteps than to mediate
intense disagreements between justices about the fundamental nature of the Constitution.”).
180
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
181
Id. at 377 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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It makes sense to be more concerned about harmful errors than harmless
ones, just like it makes sense to be more concerned about clear mistakes than
close calls. This is easy to see from the standpoint of an individual Justice.
A Justice whose interpretive theory revolves around, say, popular
sovereignty might distinguish severe interferences with the will of the people
from minor interferences.182 She accordingly might deem herself bound to
tolerate the latter category of mistakes even as she votes to overturn the
former. For example, she might draw a line between judicial failures to
protect constitutional liberties, which the people can correct through ordinary
legislation, and judicial recognition of liberties that lack any constitutional
basis, which the people can correct only through the cumbersome
amendment process.183 Likewise, a Justice who believes that moral
judgments are crucial to constitutional interpretation might vote to overrule
deeply unjust decisions even as she tolerates mild transgressions of justice
on grounds of stare decisis.184
The problem is that these determinations of harmfulness, like
distinctions between clear error and ordinary error, depend on
methodological and normative commitments that vary from Justice to
Justice. Some Justices might think popular sovereignty is paramount in
constitutional interpretation. Some might think morality and justice are key
considerations. Interpretive philosophy tells a Justice which factors deserve
primacy and which are irrelevant. When Justices hold different interpretive
philosophies, we should expect them to part ways over the types of
considerations they view as most important A statute is not rendered
unconstitutional simply by the fact that it is “bad” in some sense. The
question is whether it is bad in ways that matter. Similar logic applies to the
doctrine of stare decisis. Even if every Justice agreed that the harms caused
by a particular precedent were serious, there could still be disagreement
about whether those harms were pertinent to constitutional interpretation.
On balance, then, a precedent’s perceived harms generally should be
excluded from the stare decisis calculus. That is the best way to ensure that
precedent is genuinely constraining, as opposed to giving way in the face of
disagreements over interpretive philosophy that lead to divergent views
182
See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV.
1437, 1442 (2007).
183
See id. (“Presumptive invalidity . . . is generally required when an erroneous prior decision either
maintains a structural error in the political process or completely immunizes an issue from majoritarian
politics. Structural problems undermine the legitimacy of law, while erroneous immunizations require a
supermajoritarian response where none may be possible.”).
184
Cf. BREYER, supra note 20, at 150–51 (noting that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), “overturned an earlier decision that the justices considered legally wrong, out of step with society
and the law, and unusually harmful”).
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about the sorts of consequences that are legally relevant. I have argued in
other work that there may be a narrow exception for cases in which a
precedent’s effects are so exceptionally dire as to be intolerable from the
standpoint of a particular Justice applying her personal interpretive
philosophy.185 But even if one supports this exception in theory, it arises in
only a small fraction of cases. The more general takeaway is that tolerating
some undesirable effects is the price of impersonality and constraint.
Again, this is not a constitutional mandate. Still, it reflects the
fundamental importance of constraint and impersonality to the constitutional
regime. At base, my argument has been that the Constitution is best
understood as demanding some special justification for departing from
precedent. I have also suggested that in putting this principle into practice,
the Supreme Court should avoid asking whether an interpretive error is
particularly clear or whether a precedent’s effects are especially harmful.
Those inquires depend on underlying methodological and normative
commitments that vary from Justice to Justice, and relying on them dampens
precedent’s ability to unite Justices across the philosophical spectrum. It is
possible to say that a precedent’s clear mistake (as opposed to a mistake that
is less obvious) is a special justification for overruling it. It is possible to say
the same about a precedent’s problematic consequences (as opposed to
consequences that are more benign). I have challenged these distinctions as
diluting the effect of stare decisis in a world of interpretive pluralism, but
that does not mean the distinctions are constitutionally prohibited. My
account of stare decisis as a constitutional principle requires a presumption
of deference to prior decisions even if one believes them to be mistaken.
How that presumption may be rebutted is a separate matter.
C. Scope of Deference
Specifying the conditions for overruling a decision is only half the story
for a system of precedent. We need to pay equal attention to the rules that
define a decision’s scope of applicability. Whether past decisions are read
narrowly or broadly goes a long way toward determining their impact on the
trajectory of constitutional law.
While I have defended an interpretation of the Constitution that requires
presumptive deference to precedent, that argument does not define the
principles of precedential scope. Nevertheless, the underlying emphasis on
constraint offers some lessons for how precedents should be—as a matter of
sound judging, not constitutional imperative—construed in order to infuse
the doctrine of stare decisis with genuine force.
185

See KOZEL, supra note 101, at 122–23.
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First and foremost, past decisions should be interpreted broadly enough
to provide a meaningful check on the discretion of future Justices. That
requirement does not dictate a single approach to defining precedents’ scope
of applicability, but it does furnish a baseline: Future Justices must not limit
precedents to their facts. Such an approach would undermine the prospect of
constraint and reduce prior decisions to “arbitrary exercise[s] of judicial
power”186 by driving a wedge between legal orders and the reasoned
deliberation that precedes them. Precedents should instead be treated as
establishing legal rules that—as all rules do187—extend beyond the specific
context in which they arose. This is not the same as infusing so-called dicta
with binding effect. Future Justices certainly may choose to withhold
deference from prior statements that are hypothetical or ancillary. At the
same time, they should recognize that fidelity to precedent entails fidelity to
the legal rule a prior decision helped to establish.188 It is the confluence of
reasoning and result that matters.
Of course, Justices will continue to debate how best to characterize
various precedents in applying them to new facts. Our present concern is not
to work out the details of the rules of precedential scope but to set the
constitutional baseline. By recognizing stare decisis as a constitutional
principle grounded in considerations such as the need for judicial constraint,
we can see the value of treating precedents as embodiments and applications
of legal rules rather than fact-bound, ad hoc determinations. The Supreme
Court may—and should, for the sake of uniformity and predictability—
continue to develop specific criteria for defining the scope of precedent as
part of the common law of stare decisis. Relevant questions include whether
judges should defer to doctrinal frameworks and how they should handle a
prior court’s statement of its rationale.189 But the most important step is
ensuring that precedents are treated as sources of legal rules that can impose
meaningful constraint.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING CONSTITUTIONAL
The previous Part discussed how the constitutional foundations of stare
decisis inform the doctrine’s composition and operation. This Part turns to

186

See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2030 (1994).
See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1989) (“Every rule,
by virtue of being a rule, decides issues that are broader than the particular facts of the cases in which
they are announced.”) (emphasis removed).
188
Cf. Waldron, supra note 99, at 23 (arguing that a subsequent judge’s duty is to treat the rule of a
precedent case “as a genuine legal norm to which the court that he belongs to has already committed
itself”).
189
See Kozel, Scope of Precedent, supra note 147, at 190–98.
187
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implications for the constitutional system more broadly, with particular
attention to three issues: the legal legitimacy of deferring to precedent, the
role of arguments from precedent in judicial reasoning, and the locus of
governmental authority over the rules of precedent.
A. Legitimacy
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s consistent treatment of stare
decisis as legally valid, some scholars have challenged the idea that the Court
may properly defer to a precedent that misconstrues the Constitution.190
Recognizing stare decisis as a constitutional inference removes any doubts
about the doctrine’s legitimacy, by which I mean its validity as a legal
norm.191
On the account I have defended, deferring to precedent is more than a
“good idea.”192 It is a constitutional principle that can properly affect the
outcomes of cases.193 When stare decisis is recognized as an “authoritative
legal norm[],”194 there is no longer any uncertainty about its legitimacy. That
remains true even if the Supreme Court reaches a result it would have
rejected but for the existence of precedent. As I have explained, the Court
has a variety of options for structuring the doctrine of stare decisis. On some
of those formulations, the strength of deference to precedent will be
relatively strong. On other formulations, the strength of deference will be
weaker. Either way, precedent remains a legitimate part of constitutional
decisionmaking. Questions about the legitimacy of stare decisis are answered
by the doctrine’s constitutional foundations.
We can press on this idea by asking whether any formulations of the
doctrine would violate the Constitution by being too strong in their insulation
of prior decisions. Imagine, for example, that the Supreme Court declares
that it henceforth will not even consider arguments asking it to overrule its
prior constitutional decisions. Rather, every such decision is deemed to be

190

See supra Section III.A.
On the concept of legal legitimacy, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794–95 (2005). My focus on legal legitimacy is not meant to deny the
possibility that stare decisis may also be legitimate in other senses, such as through its “current
sociological acceptance.” Id. at 1792.
192
Cf. Harrison, supra note 21, at 533 (describing the argument that stare decisis is desirable because
“rules of precedent will enable the courts to provide generally accurate and stable legal rules while
economizing on scarce decisional resources”).
193
Id. at 508.
194
Id.
191
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absolutely and fully insulated from overruling.195 Might this create a
constitutional problem, for example by denying litigants due process of
law?196 Resolving that question is beyond my purview here, for our current
system of stare decisis is in no danger of overstepping constitutional bounds.
So long as the doctrine maintains a resemblance to its current state—in which
presumptive deference is integral, but the Court remains willing to overrule
its prior decisions when it perceives a special justification for doing so—
there is no risk of facing a Court that will not entertain an argument for
overruling. The more salient constitutional question is whether a Justice may
legitimately defer to a decision she views as flawed on the merits. I have
argued that the best inference from the Constitution suggests that the answer
is yes.
B. Reasoning
Precedent does its most controversial work when there are good reasons
to dispense with it.197 The doctrine of stare decisis revolves around the idea
that the desirable pressure judges feel to get the law right should be tempered
by recognition of the importance of leaving things settled.198
Were stare decisis grounded exclusively in “prudential and pragmatic
considerations” and disconnected from the Constitution,199 we might
conclude that the doctrine should give way whenever the stakes are high. If
a prior decision drastically interferes with individual liberty or the proper
operation of the government, it seems natural that deference should yield.
Stability may be well and good, but when it conflicts with important rights
such as those involving free speech, police searches, or jury trials, the policy
of deference should not be allowed to undermine the Constitution’s
protections.200 There are hints in the Supreme Court’s case law of this type
195

For discussion of the United Kingdom’s experience during the twentieth century with an
extremely strong form of deference, see NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT
125–28 (2008).
196
See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2003)
(arguing that when the doctrine of stare decisis “effectively forecloses a litigant from meaningfully urging
error-correction,” it “unconstitutionally deprives a litigant of the right to a hearing on the merits of her
claims”).
197
Cf. Schauer, supra note 94, at 575 (“[I]f we are truly arguing from precedent, then the fact that
something was decided before gives it present value despite our current belief that the previous decision
was erroneous.”).
198
See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
199
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
200
Cf. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 n.5 (2013) (“The force of stare decisis is at its
nadir in cases concerning procedural rules that implicate fundamental constitutional protections.”);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (“[S]tare decisis does not compel the continued
acceptance of [the relevant precedent]. The Government may regulate corporate political speech through
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of approach.201 The vision of precedent on display is a relatively weak one in
which deference is effectively reserved for the least significant cases. The
doctrine of stare decisis tips the scales toward continuity when the stakes are
low but not when serious constitutional interests are on the line.
But judgments about stare decisis should not be made solely by looking
at the costs of deference in a particular case. A system of precedent works to
cabin judicial discretion and ensure that all members of society, from public
officials to private citizens, are bound by the law. It aspires to “principled
predictability” in which disputes are resolved based on overarching, publicly
accessible norms rather than case-specific or judge-specific criteria.202
Deferring to precedent surely is not the only way for a judicial system to
function.203 But it is a way that fits well with the blueprint of the U.S.
Constitution.
All of this is easier to see once we recognize deference to precedent as
a constitutional principle. Stare decisis operates as a structural mechanism
for promoting fairness and liberty through legal impersonality and
continuity.204 The Supreme Court has emphasized the liberty-enhancing
features of the Constitution’s structure in various ways. “Federalism,” the
Court has explained, “secures the freedom of the individual.”205 Likewise,
“the separation of powers can serve to safeguard individual liberty.”206 The
same is true of precedent.
disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.”); Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) (“We have never relied on stare decisis to justify the continuance of an
unconstitutional police practice.”).
201
See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Speech, 115 MICH. L. REV. 439, 484–86 (2017).
202
See Waldron, supra note 99, at 13–14 (describing a “principled predictability” that “results from
mapping an official and publicly disseminated understanding of the various sources of law onto the factual
situations that people confront”).
203
See id. at 30–31 (declining to endorse the view that the rule of law depends on stare decisis, but
suggesting that “the justification of stare decisis might depend to a large extent on the rule of law”).
204
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (noting connections between constitutional
structure and “our liberty and republican form of government”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1155
(1992) (“The genius of the American Constitution lies in its use of structural devices to preserve
individual liberty.”).
205
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011).
206
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014); see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“By diffusing federal powers among
three different branches, and by protecting each branch against incursions from the others, the Framers
devised a structure of government that promotes both liberty and accountability.”); Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011) (“Article III protects liberty not only through its role in implementing the
separation of powers, but also by specifying the defining characteristics of Article III judges. . . . By
appointing judges to serve without term limits, and restricting the ability of the other branches to remove
judges or diminish their salaries, the Framers sought to ensure that each judicial decision would be
rendered, not with an eye toward currying favor with Congress or the Executive, but rather with the
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When stare decisis is viewed as a constitutional principle, it is more
difficult to brush off deference as a nice idea but one that should not stand in
the way of vindicating important rights or interests. Adjudication is no longer
a matter of pitting precedent against what the Constitution demands. Instead,
the question is how to handle two principles that pull in opposite directions
but that each trace back to the Constitution. It becomes plausible that
precedent might sometimes carry the day even when the stakes are high.
As noted above, the Constitution does not dictate how the doctrine of
precedent should balance competing interests in particular cases. The tasks
of doctrinal composition and application remain for the Supreme Court, so
long as it preserves the requirement of a special justification for overruling
that goes beyond mere disagreement. As the Court develops and applies the
rules of precedent, it does more than implement a sound policy. It discharges
an obligation rooted in the Constitution itself.
C. Authority Over the Rules of Precedent
I argued in Part II that by distinguishing the judicial power from the
powers of the executive and legislature, and by giving federal judges life
tenure and salary protection, the Constitution suggests a vision of judging as
unique among forms of official action. The interplay between judicial
decisions and the separation of powers also arises in a second way, one that
relates to the locus of authority over the rules of precedent in the federal
system.
Even if the Constitution permits courts to apply the doctrine of stare
decisis, there is an argument that Congress may forbid courts from invoking
it.207 The rationale is that if stare decisis is a feature of the common law that
survived the Constitution’s enactment but remains subject to congressional
control, courts may defer to precedent only on terms permitted by
Congress.208 On this theory, Congress may craft rules of precedent so long as
‘[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts’ deemed ‘essential to good judges.’” (quoting 1 WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 363 (J. Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896))).
207
See Paulsen, Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at 1540 (“The courts have the Article III power to decide
constitutional cases on their merits. A statute abrogating stare decisis does not impair that power; it merely
directs courts to carry out that constitutional power without regard to nonconstitutional policy or
pragmatic considerations, where Congress has legislated a different policy with respect to such
considerations.”).
208
See Harrison, supra note 21, at 505 (“The first question is whether the federal courts’ norms of
precedent are the kind of legal rule that is susceptible to alteration by ordinary legislation. My answer is
yes. Most of them are federal common law, or as it was once called, general law . . . .”); cf. MCGINNIS &
RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 168–69 (arguing that “[t]here are strong reasons for concluding that the
Framers’ generation would have understood the judicial power to include a minimal concept of precedent,
which requires that some weight be given to a series of decisions,” but noting that “[t]he bulk of precedent
rules . . . are a matter of common law that is revisable by congressional statute”).
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they are “adopted on their systemic merits, not in order to produce particular
outcomes.”209 Congress’s authority may even extend to forbidding deference
altogether.
The analysis is different if stare decisis is a constitutional principle. On
the account I have developed, stare decisis is part of the constitutional
blueprint, albeit a part that arises from a set of inferences. As a constitutional
principle, stare decisis is beyond Congress’s power to abolish.210 The
Supreme Court has a constitutional obligation to treat precedents with
presumptive respect. That obligation does not fully define the rules of
precedent, but it does demand that an overruling be justified by something
more than the belief that one would have decided a case differently as an
initial matter. Congress can no more abolish the doctrine of stare decisis than
it can dispense with Article III’s rule that a conviction for treason requires
the testimony of two witnesses.211 Given its status as a principle of
constitutional structure, the doctrine of stare decisis is insulated from
legislative abolition.
It is a separate question whether Congress may dictate particular rules
of stare decisis so long as it leaves intact the requirement of presumptive
deference. Of course, Congress regularly shapes proceedings in the federal
courts. For example, the federal rules of evidence reflect legislative
enactments that courts must follow.212 We can imagine Congress taking a
similar approach to precedent by enacting various rules to bind the Supreme
Court. Congress might require that in determining whether there is a special
justification for overruling, the Court must give weight to whether a
precedent is inconsistent with related lines of cases.213 Or it might provide
209
Harrison, supra note 21, at 531; see also MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 172 (“[T]he
Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to frame only genuine precedent rules, not subterfuges
for reaching particular results—that is, to exercise legislative, not judicial, power. Consequently, these
precedent rules must be relatively general in scope and application.”).
210
See Fallon, Stare Decisis, supra note 12, at 592 (“The power to say what the Constitution means
or requires . . . implies a power to determine the sources of authority on which constitutional rulings
properly rest. To recognize a congressional power to determine the weight to be accorded to precedent . . .
would infringe that core judicial function.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Harrison, supra note 21, at 506
(“Congress may not alter constitutional rules, because the Constitution is hierarchically superior to
statutes.”).
211
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony
of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”); cf. Harrison, supra note 21,
at 507 (using the two-witness requirement as an example of a rule that “Congress may not displace”).
212
See Paulsen, Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at 1587 (“What are the Federal Rules of Evidence (and
other sets of procedural rules) if not a direct regulation, pursuant to Congress’s power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, of how the judiciary goes about its business of deciding cases?”).
213
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (noting the relevance of
“whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine”).
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that even if there is a special justification for overruling, the Court must
consider whether substantial disruption would result.214
Enactments like these would not offend the status of precedent as a
constitutional principle, because they would preserve the presumption of
deference and the requirement of a special justification for overruling that
goes beyond disagreement on the merits. If the enactments were nevertheless
to violate the Constitution, it would be for other reasons. Maybe they would
overstep Congress’s powers under Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause,
leaving no basis for legislative action.215 Or maybe they impermissibly
conflict with the Court’s established practice of treating stare decisis as a
“basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch,”216 as bolstered
by Congress’s longstanding failure to challenge that understanding by
passing responsive legislation.217 Whatever one makes of such arguments,
the core of stare decisis remains beyond the reach of the political branches.
CONCLUSION
In one form or another, precedent has been part of American legal
culture for centuries.218 And stare decisis remains a well-established feature
of federal practice to this day. Even so, there continues to be uncertainty over
exactly what stare decisis is and exactly where it comes from. I have argued
that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s frequent descriptions of stare
214
Cf. id. at 854 (noting the relevance of “whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation”).
215
See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 171 (“Congressional power to establish or
revise precedent rules for constitutional cases in federal courts is found in Congress’s authority to pass
laws that are necessary and proper for carrying into execution the judicial power. This power allows
Congress to pass laws that permit the judiciary to perform its job more effectively.”); Steven G. Calabresi,
Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 340 (2005)
(arguing that “practice has settled the matter such that the Court does have an autonomous, implied power
to sometimes follow precedent,” which cannot “be restricted by Congress legislating under the Necessary
and Proper Clause”); Harrison, supra note 21, at 505 (“The necessary and proper power . . . authorizes
legislation that is based on systemic considerations that are divorced from particular doctrinal results and
hence would not enable Congress to control outcomes in areas where it may not legislate the substantive
rule.”).
216
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
217
See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59 (2017); cf. id. at 75 (“[I]f
one branch has long articulated a constitutional view about the separation of powers and the other branch
has been silent, it may not be clear whether there is any agreement between the branches. Nevertheless,
the views of the branch that has maintained the position may still be entitled to some deference, especially
if these views have been consistent and have reflected the views of both major political parties.”).
218
Fallon, Stare Decisis, supra note 12, at 580 (“Although stare decisis was initially a common law
doctrine, its extension into constitutional law finds support in early constitutional history.”); Healy, supra
note 45, at 1183 (“Although I do not believe that American courts had fully embraced stare decisis by
1789, they did so over the next half century and have followed the principle for more than 150 years.”).
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decisis as a creature of judicial policy, the doctrine is best understood as an
implied constitutional principle. It fills out the constitutional framework and
promotes individual liberty by fostering impersonality, stability, and
constraint. Deference is only presumptive; the doctrine of stare decisis does
not flatly forbid overrulings. But it does require that they happen for
permissible reasons.
The Supreme Court has a central role to play in developing the law of
precedent, and Congress likewise has some authority to influence the rules
applied in the federal courts. Yet the Constitution sets the baseline:
Presumptive deference to precedent is part of the constitutional framework.
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